Piracy off the coast of Somalia splashed onto the global stage in 2009 at near epidemic levels. The impact of Somali piracy affected the entire global community as shipping costs soared costing the global community as much as $18 Billion.[i] The wave of piracy attacks however was short lived due to a quick and comprehensive response by the international community to counter piracy and its causes. The world’s response to Somalia continues today and is a reversal of 20 years of alienation prior; that made possible Somalia’s de-evolution into a failed state that the world ignored and feared simultaneously. The success countering the three-year piracy epidemic however shadows the success of piracy for Somalia by demanding attention and assistance for a withering nation – in effect: piracy saved Somalia.
To understand Somali piracy you must understand Somali history. Somalia, unlike the majority of Africa, was never truly colonized in the traditional manner. The entirety of what is historically known as Somalia has been sliced and diced over the course of a century by the Italians, Ethiopians, British, French, Kenyan and arguably its own people in the northern area known as Somaliland. Whereas most African nations can be viewed in the chronological construct of untouched, colonized, transitioning, independent, etc. Somalia was effectively passed through colonist hands in more of an asymmetrical manner. This particular style left Somalia fitting the profile of a foster child who has been passed from one foster home to another with no consistency like the other colonized states. This particular case makes Somalia highly difficult to fit into traditional colonial paradigms like other African states.[ii]
In 1956, Somalia was granted “Internal Autonomy” by their Italian colonizers. In 1960, Somalia was given full independence. From 1960 to 1969, Somalia saw a slew of border conflicts and domestic political struggles that left Siad Barre as its leader. Barre, in 1970 declared Somalia a Socialist states with support from the Soviets. It seemed that Somalia was on the course for being a successful Soviet client state in a critical juncture of the world with ample coastline and a strategic asset over all. There was a sense of a “Greater Somalia” seemingly only when Barre took over and struggled to not only keep the ethnic Somali regions that were taken by Kenya but also reached out to annex the Ogaden region in Ethiopia. It was this attempted annexation that was the downfall as Somalia as a solidified nation.[iii]
Barre made a drastic miscalculation when he invaded the Somali-inhabited Ogaden region of Ethiopia in 1977. Barre had hoped for a “Greater Somalia” by bringing all Somalis in to the fold of a unified Somalia. Somalia was also just hit with a draught and Barre may have been attempting to acquire more fertile ground in Ethiopia. The Soviets in an odd twist of events opted to back Ethiopia, in turn soliciting the US to back Somalia over the Ogaden region. This fascinating conflict consisted of not only massive Soviet backing but also support (to include large numbers of troops) from supporters to include Cuba, North Korea, South Yemen and East Germany. The 8-month-long, war killed over half-a-million people and ended with Somalia retreating to the pre-conflict borders with its military ravished.[iv]
Not long after its state collapsed in 1991 followed by the Black Hawk incident was the withdrawal of nearly all international actors. Somalia has been off grid essentially for nearly two decades with seemingly small occasional engagement over the last decade. This complete disengagement left Somalia open to whoever had the bigger gun and for Somalia viewed as the most dangerous country in the world. However, it was 2006 that really began to bring the Somalia conversation to the table. The international community acknowledged that Somalia was a moment away from becoming the next Afghanistan – a geographical security vacuum where the likes of Al Qaeda or any negative influencer or violent actor could base itself.[v]
The assessment was too accurate. In 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) – a collection of Sharia Law businessmen with militias – decided to take governance into their own hands and push out the chaos-causing warlords, intent on establishing an Islamic rule of law – and they were successful in securing Mogadishu. The great irony was that Mogadishu for the first time in 15 years actually was stable. There was a rule of law, albeit mostly Sharia Law, certain basic services began to trickle in and Mogadishu’s air and seaports re-opened after remaining closed for over a decade. Essentially, it seemed that there was a fighting chance for at least the capital, Mogadishu to stabilize.
This situation was far from ideal in the international community’s eyes, specifically the United States and Europe, having just spent half a decade battling Islamic extremism and with two counterinsurgencies waging away in Iraq and Afghanistan. To the credit of Ethiopia and her Western backers, the ICU was far from a liberal organization – the rule of law was existent but it was violently strict. Also, the ICU were believed to be harboring a known terrorist responsible for his involvement in the US Embassy Bombings in sub-Saharan Africa. This was enough to convince the US and her allies that the ICU was not an option. [vi] This same year, Ethiopian troops began to engage the ICU to evict them from the capital effectively in December of 2006.[vii]
For all of 2007 and 2008, Ethiopian troops combined with African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), “a peace keeping mission operated by the African Union in Somalia with approval by the United Nations” secured the bulk of Mogadishu and surrounding southern Somalia.[viii] There was resistance however, from ICU and warlord remnants. In January 2009, Ethiopia withdrew its forces as planned. Immediately following their withdrawal, a new organization arrived to replace them: Al Shabaab. Al Shabaab is essentially a more violent, extremist splinter organization from the ICU. They believed forfeiting their power and territory was sacrosanct and were willing to engage in all means necessary to reclaim it. In 2009, the world watched painfully as Al Shabaab captures town after town, re-instilling their version of Sharia Law to include executing a full attack on Mogadishu.[ix]
As 2010 arrived, a famine had struck Somalia that would last for two years killing over a quarter million people. Simultaneously, Al Shabaab was wreaking havoc on any international organizations still present and the United Nation’s World Food Program had to withdraw from Al Shabaab controlled territory leaving little to no assistance to those starving from the famine. In February of 2010, in a not so surprising move, Al Shabaab declared its allegiance to Al Qaeda. This moment was arguably the lowest point in recent Somali history from the perspective of the international community. Essentially, all the gains made by the African Union and Ethiopian forces, were not only reversed back to essentially the ICU, but an Al Qaeda franchise who took over the entire southern part of the country to include the capital. The situation stayed essentially unchanged for all over 2010 and most of 2011 as onlookers watched to decide what to do next.[x]
One important thing did change however, though not on land. From 2009 through 2011, a piracy epidemic took hold. For three years, off the coast of Somalia piracy incidents to include hijacking and hostage for ransom skyrocketed to unprecedented levels. Considering the vital importance of the Gulf of Aden to global maritime transportation of all nations, this was a dire scenario. The global community immediately moved to act by deploying naval ships from several countries to the Gulf of Aden region and further out into the Indian Ocean to protect the shipping lanes. This was a watershed moment of global relations where the world saw actors as diverse as the US, Iran, Russia, India and China all come together to neutralize the threat. This maritime international intervention was a stellar success and in 2012, Somali piracy was virtually non-existent. This was for good reason – considering the World Bank calculated that Somali piracy was costing the global economy $18 Billion a year.[xi]
The result of Somali piracy was and still is a global collaborative effort to stabilize the country and its waters. The world’s navies came together to solve for the maritime threats and the worlds military, political and aid organizations came together to solve for the land issues. AMISOM countered the Al Shabaab threats on land in order to neutralize the factors that lead to piracy and the connection between piracy and Al Shabaab.
Back on land, Al Shabaab was excelling –partially due to funds from the piracy. Reports that Al Shabaab was even executing small-scale attacks in northern Kenya, led to Kenya’s deployment of military forces into southern Somalia in order to carve out a buffer zone.[xii] The 2012 year saw dramatic progress for Somalia. Al Shabaab began to lose ground by a combination of Kenyan forces from the south; African Union and Somali government forces from Mogadishu, US unmanned aerial vehicles from above and contingents of Ethiopian forces from the west. In August of 2012, Somalia swore in its first parliament in over twenty years. In September, the first Presidential election since 1967 occurred.[xiii]
The following year, 2013, continued on trajectory of rapid progress for Somalia. It began in January when the US recognized the Government of Somalia for the first time since the state’s collapse in 1991. Having a formal government with a relatively Al Shabaab free zone the international community now had a formidable entity to support. In April of 2013, the US successfully petitioned the UN Security Council to lift the arms embargo on Somalia making it now legal to provide arms to the new Somali military in order to retain their ground and defend against Al Shabaab forces. Since March 2014, AMISOM began an extensive clearing operation that has forced Al Shabaab to flee into the countryside while they simultaneously began executing high profile attacks in Mogadishu.[xiv]With chaos in Somalia as the back drop, it is easier to understand how and why piracy reared its ugly eye-patch.
Piracy existed notably off the coast of Somalia particularly since the state collapsed in 1991 however; it was not until 2006 when the International Maritime Bureau reported a significant increase of piracy incidents, ten in total. This was the first increase in three years. By the end of 2007, the International Maritime Bureau reported that piracy incidents had tripled – in just one year. The beginning of 2008 brought another significant increase in the first quarter alone; leading the European Union to call for “international efforts to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia”. A month later, the United Nations Security Council voted unanimously to permit naval vessels from nations affected, into the waters of Somalia. In August of the same year, the Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) is established by a coalition of navies belonging to Combined Task Force 150. Subsequently, in October of 2008 NATO deployed a naval force charged with patrolling the Somali waters.[xv]
On 8 April 2009, the renowned “Maersk Alabama” was hijacked by Somali pirates. This was the first American vessel to be subject to piracy in over 200 years. The US responded swiftly by sending in a Navy SEAL team to solve the problem. This event was later in 2013 turned into the movie “Captain Phillips”. The year 2009 proved to be a savage boon for piracy, with the number of piracy incidents more than doubling to 181. It was this year that Somali piracy became regularly reported on in the American media. The following two years, 2010 and 2011 showed no end in sight of the piracy problem. Incident numbers stayed about the same for 2010 and 2011 illustrated a small win with successful hijacking almost cutting in half but incidents overall only dropped by about fifteen incidents. This change in successful hijackings was probably due to increased on-board anti-piracy security measures – though the attempted hijacking still continued at an alarming rate.[xvi]
Then something happened and in 2012, there were only thirty-two incidents and only seven successful hijackings. As 2013 rolled into 2014, the final annual count only listed two incidents and no hijackings. Four months into 2014 there have been no hijackings and no incidents.[xvii] The reasoning behind this dramatic change, and arguably the death of Somali piracy as we have known it for the last half a decade, is a collaborative effort by the international community. What happened was actually rather remarkable in the sense that countries who were historical enemies began helping each other and working together to counter Somali piracy – and it worked.[xviii] Despite the three-year epidemic of piracy, it is critical to understand the two unintentional positive effects of piracy. The first being a dramatic transfer of wealth into Somali communities.
In absence of significant foreign aid to Somalia, and with little to no traditional means of income, Somalis turned to the one opportunity available to them – piracy. Despite the risk of death or imprisonment, “the 0.01 percent they might make — $30,000 on average — is 54 times the country’s average annual salary of about $550.”[xix] This cost-benefit analysis was basic economics according to Scott Carney of Wired Magazine who created an astonishing break down of Somali pirate economic analysis titled “Cutthroat Capitalism: An Economic Analysis of the Somalia Pirate Business Model.” In an extensive graphic breakdown of economic formulas and calculations made easy for the layman, Carney clarifies how piracy was the best decision a pirate could make. Looking at the societal impact it is also no wonder that piracy was supported during the peak years.[xx]
As piracy increased, so did the wealth transfer that moved millions of dollars from ransom payers to the pirates. As ransom money poured in “to Somalia, it [went] into the local economy, creating jobs and wealth and fueling micro economies along the coast.”[xxi]This significant transfer of wealth affected real estate development, sent basic wages through the roof, employed thousands and even created its own investment market.
As these micro-economies developed so did the number of those essentially employed by piracy. Despite a UN study that claimed 50% of the revenue went to financiers outside of Somalia, the amount of revenue that poured into traditionally impoverished pirate villages was staggering in comparison to their traditional income levels. Out of the estimated $400 Million that was paid to pirates, “about 30% of a ransom payment goes to pirates, 10% to their shore-based helpers, 10% in gifts and bribes to the local community and 50% to financiers and sponsors, who are generally based abroad.” The same report “estimated that 10,000 to 15,000 people are employed by the pirates indirectly in related industries such as boat repair, security, and food provision. (Other enterprising Somalis have set up special restaurants to cater to the hostages.)”[xxii]
With increased revenue entering Somali pirate towns, wages began to skyrocket. In one particular village, “the daily wage increased from 40,000 Somali shillings in 2005 to 120,000 in 2011 […] this is likely to reflect both direct employment opportunities and investments into local businesses.” In the graphic below, it is illustrated how high the wages exploded beginning and continuing from the start of piracy in 2008 and 2009. [xxiii]
Aside from wage increases, piracy revenue had such an impact on Somali pirate town economies that a rather robust stock exchange of sorts was set up for investment into the industry.[xxiv] As one wealthy former pirate stated “we decided to set up this stock exchange. We started with 15 ‘maritime companies’ and now we are hosting 72 […] the shares are open to all and everybody can take part, whether personally at sea or on land by providing cash, weapons or useful materials … we’ve made piracy a community activity.” A town official even added that “piracy-related business has become the main profitable economic activity in our area and as locals we depend on their output […] the district gets a percentage of every ransom from ships that have been released, and that goes on public infrastructure, including our hospital and our public schools.”[xxv] The outcome is that “[p]iracy has changed [the official’s town of] Harardheere from a small fishing village to a town crowded with luxury cars.”[xxvi]
The visual signs of the growth were apparent also. Community real estate development increased. In January 2012, BBC published an article summarizing a Chatham House report published the same month, titled “Treasure Mapped: Using Satellite Imagery to Track the Developmental Effects of Somali Piracy.” Chronological comparisons of pirate towns illustrated the growth over the years. Daytime satellite imagery analysis illustrated that the pirate town of Garowe for example almost doubled in size from 2002 to 2009.[xxvii]
The benefit was not limited to pirates. In an odd turn of events, piracy has benefited the local fishing industry. Whereas before large oversized foreign fishing vessels would troll through their fishing waters catching the fish faster than they could be replenished. Now, with the fear of piracy in the nearby shore waters rarely does anyone come through anymore. This has left a significant increase in the supply of fish for the local fishermen and their communities. Fishermen now can catch upwards to £200 a day whereas before they averaged under £5. Even the sizes of the fish have been reported to be the largest catches in 40 years.[xxviii]Somali economies significant alteration was the immediate positive effect. It was not however the only positive effect – another more global and lasting consequence was just beginning.
As the world began to focus on solutions to Somali piracy, they first began with counterpiracy and maritime security methods. Security contractors who historically worked in Iraq and Afghanistan began offering solutions to Somalia piracy.[xxix] According to the British Parliament, “the proportion of successful attacks has fallen dramatically, due to a combination of self-defence measures and the effects of the naval patrols”.[xxx] There is no question that increased offshore security measures decreased the number of successful pirate attacks as you can see in the graphic below.[xxxi]
However, the number of attempts did not decrease as fast, leaving the international community to require a solution to causes of piracy as a whole – onshore.[xxxii] Despite “military vessels from NATO, the European Union, Russia, China and dozens of other countries patrol the Indian Ocean waters” the consensus for an onshore solution continued to build as analysis clarified that “[a]ll the experts agree that the only long-term solution to the problem of piracy is to restore law and order on land.”[xxxiii][xxxiv]
For three years, off the coast of Somalia piracy incidents to include hijacking and hostage for ransom skyrocketed to unprecedented levels. Considering the vital importance of the Gulf of Aden to global maritime transportation of all nations, this was a dire scenario. The global community immediately moved to act by deploying naval ships from several countries to the Gulf of Aden region and further out into the Indian Ocean to protect the shipping lanes. This was a watershed moment of global relations where the world saw actors as diverse as the United States, Iran, India and China all come together to neutralize the threat. This maritime international intervention was a stellar success and in 2012, Somali piracy was virtually non-existent.to summarize the outcome of how Somali piracy brought the world together to solve for it, there is no better way to say it than by saying:
“[t]his is the irony of International Security Dynamics […]: ‘Piracy may be unique in international affairs for its ability to bring enemies together. Pakistan has saved Indian sailors from Somali pirates. China and Taiwan, same thing. The U.S. Navy saved Iranian sailors practically every weekend in January. Cats and dogs living together, mass hysteria, etc.’””[xxxv]
It is no coincidence that the peak years of Somali piracy coincided with the beginning of an integrated, international, intervention by the global community. The last great year of Somali piracy was 2011, that concluded three years of hyper-inflated piracy attack numbers and an increased number for the few years before that. The international aid response became highly apparent in 2011, which corresponded with foreign aid to Somalia to be roughly double of the average aid amounts for the half a decade prior.[xxxvi]
Back on land, Al Shabaab was excelling – partially due to funds from the piracy. Reports that Al Shabaab was even executing small-scale attacks in northern Kenya, led to Kenya’s deployment of military forces into southern Somalia in order to carve out a buffer zone.[xxxvii] The 2012 year saw dramatic progress for Somalia. Al Shabaab began to lose ground by a combination of Kenyan forces from the south; AMISOM forces from Mogadishu, US unmanned aerial vehicles from above and contingents of Ethiopian forces from the west. These exceptional security gains provided space for political progress all supported by the international community. In August of 2012, Somalia swore in its first parliament in over twenty years. In September, the first Presidential election since 1967 occurred.
The following year, 2013, continued on trajectory of rapid progress for Somalia. It began in January when the US recognized the Government of Somalia for the first time since the state’s collapse in 1991. Having a formal government with a relatively Al Shabaab free zone the international community now had a formidable entity to support. In April of 2013, the US successfully petitioned the UN Security Council to lift the arms embargo on Somalia making it now legal to provide arms to the new Somali military in order to retain their ground and defend against Al Shabaab forces.
What has been seen so far is a change in strategy and tactics by Al Shabaab. They have shifted from rebel groups holding territory to somewhere between insurgents and terrorists. There urban tactics resemble that of terrorism – dispersed high profile attacks. However, their forfeiting of urban space to avoid direct force-on-force conflict in order to flee for the countryside and launch attacks from there is a shift to insurgency. The likely approach will be the combination of the two and will have lasting impact. Al Shabaab is never going to be a conventional existential threat to the Somali state again; however, they will continue to pose a threat via terrorist methods bordering on insurgency. In April 2014, it was announced that Somalia would be deploying troops to assist with stability in South Sudan. This is a rather large step in Somalia’s security paradigm when it is able to export security.[xxxviii]
Beginning in March 2014, AMISOM initiated a sweeping campaign to oust Al Shabaab. The operation has been ongoing for about 7 weeks now. Al Shabaab has been effectively expelled to the countryside. However, they continue with high profile terrorist attacks in the capital of Mogadishu – albeit this is far better than an active insurgency or full-scale territorial control. The international community has planned what they call Vision 2016. This plan is to have fully democratic elections by 2016 with the security environment relatively stable.[xxxix]
The Somali piracy boom is over, and the numbers are the lowest they have been in several years even prior to the explosion of hijackings. As of February 2014, “1,435 suspected Somali pirates or their financiers are now in custody or jail in 21 countries.”[xl]With Somali piracy in the rear-view mirror, we can finally assess the ramifications from it. This paper is about irony, but positive irony at that. Somali piracy, executed by some of the most marginalized people on the planet, managed to affect the entire global economy and in effect alter global foreign policy for the better. It illustrates how even negative events in history often can bring about positive change. Somalia is developing and stabilizing at a rapid rate due to the extensive aid and assistance from the international community. When popular hotel resorts return to Somalia, the international community will be vindicated in all their sacrifices – but do not forget to thank the pirates.
Works Cited
[i] Kermeliotis, Teo. “Somali Pirates Cost Global Economy ‘$18 Billion a Year'” CNN. Cable News Network, 12 Apr. 2013. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.
[ii] “Somalia Profile.” BBC News. N.p., n.d. Web. 21 Apr. 2014.
[iii] “Somalia Profile.” BBC News. N.p., n.d. Web. 21 Apr. 2014.
[iv] “Somalia Profile.” BBC News. N.p., n.d. Web. 21 Apr. 2014.
[v] “Somalia Profile.” BBC News. N.p., n.d. Web. 21 Apr. 2014.
[vi] Fergusson, James. The World’s Most Dangerous Place: Inside the Outlaw State of Somalia. London: n.p., 2013. Print.
[vii] “Somalia Profile.” BBC News. N.p., n.d. Web. 21 Apr. 2014.
[viii] “AMISOM – African Union Mission In Somalia.” AMISOM. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2014.
[ix] “Somalia Profile.” BBC News. N.p., n.d. Web. 21 Apr. 2014.
[x] “Somalia Profile.” BBC News. N.p., n.d. Web. 21 Apr. 2014.
[xi] Kermeliotis, Teo. “Somali Pirates Cost Global Economy ‘$18 Billion a Year'” CNN. Cable News Network, 12 Apr. 2013. Web. 21 Apr. 2014.
[xii] “Timeline: Attacks in Kenya since Offensive against Al-Shabaab.” Sabahi RSS. N.p., n.d. Web. 21 Apr. 2014.
[xiii] “Somalia Profile.” BBC News. N.p., n.d. Web. 21 Apr. 2014.
[xiv] Kay, Nicholas, and Johnnie Carson. “Progress or Peril in Somalia?” Progress or Peril in Somalia? US Institute for Peace, Washington, DC. 22 Apr. 2014. Speech.
[xv] “Timeline: Pirates.” Infoplease. Infoplease, n.d. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.
[xvi] “Timeline: Pirates.” Infoplease. Infoplease, n.d. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.
[xvii] “Infographic: Somali Piracy Has Almost Been Eradicated.” Statista Infographics. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2014.
[xviii] “Timeline: Pirates.” Infoplease. Infoplease, n.d. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.
[xix] “Where Does Somali-Pirate Ransom Money Go?” International Business Times. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.
[xx] Carney, Scott. “Cutthroat Capitalism: An Economic Analysis of the Somali Pirate Business Model.” WIRED. N.p., 13 July 2009. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.
[xxi] Harress, Christopher. “Where Does Somali-Pirate Ransom Money Go?” International Business Times. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.
[xxii] “Somalia: Failed State, Economic Success?” : The Freeman : Foundation for Economic Education. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.
[xxiii] “Piracy ‘boosts Somalia’s Economy'” BBC News. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.
[xxiv] Hsu, Jeremy. “Somali Pirate Exchange Lets Investors Bet on Hitting a Ransom Jackpot.” Popular Science. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.
[xxv] Ahmed, Mohamed. “Somali Sea Gangs Lure Investors at Pirate Lair.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 01 Dec. 2009. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.
[xxvi] Jorisch, Avi. “Today’s Pirates Have Their Own Stock Exchange.” The Wall Street Journal. Dow Jones & Company, n.d. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.
[xxvii] “Piracy ‘boosts Somalia’s Economy'” BBC News. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.
[xxviii] “The ‘benefit’ of Somalia’s Pirates.” Channel 4 News. N.p., 25 Oct. 2009. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.
[xxix] Pentland, William. “Blackwater Floats Private Navy To Fight Pirates.” Forbes. Forbes Magazine, n.d. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.
[xxx] “House of Commons – Piracy off the Coast of Somalia – Foreign Affairs Committee.” House of Commons – Piracy off the Coast of Somalia – Foreign Affairs Committee. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.
[xxxi] “Infographic: Somali Piracy Has Almost Been Eradicated.” Statista Infographics. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2014.
[xxxii] “Infographic: Somali Piracy Has Almost Been Eradicated.” Statista Infographics. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.
[xxxiii] Sapa. “FEATURE: Somali Piracy Profits Go to Investors.” Top Stories. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2014.
[xxxiv] “Somalia: Counting the Cost of Anarchy.” BBC News. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.
[xxxv] Scott, Brandon. “Iran’s Counter-Piracy Efforts.” Soldier Spook Statesman. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2014.
[xxxvi] OECD. “Country Programmable Aid: Partner Countries.” Somalia Country Page. OECD, n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2014.
[xxxvii] “Timeline: Attacks in Kenya since Offensive against Al-Shabaab.” Sabahi RSS. N.p., n.d. Web. 21 Apr. 2014.
[xxxviii] “#Somalia Troops Deploying to #SouthSudan.” Soldier Spook Statesman. N.p., n.d. Web. 21 Apr. 2014.
[xxxix] Kay, Nicholas, and Johnnie Carson. “Progress or Peril in Somalia?” Progress or Peril in Somalia? US Institute for Peace, Washington, DC. 22 Apr. 2014. Speech.
[xl] Sapa. “FEATURE: Somali Piracy Profits Go to Investors.” Top Stories. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2014.
To understand Somali piracy you must understand Somali history. Somalia, unlike the majority of Africa, was never truly colonized in the traditional manner. The entirety of what is historically known as Somalia has been sliced and diced over the course of a century by the Italians, Ethiopians, British, French, Kenyan and arguably its own people in the northern area known as Somaliland. Whereas most African nations can be viewed in the chronological construct of untouched, colonized, transitioning, independent, etc. Somalia was effectively passed through colonist hands in more of an asymmetrical manner. This particular style left Somalia fitting the profile of a foster child who has been passed from one foster home to another with no consistency like the other colonized states. This particular case makes Somalia highly difficult to fit into traditional colonial paradigms like other African states.[ii]
In 1956, Somalia was granted “Internal Autonomy” by their Italian colonizers. In 1960, Somalia was given full independence. From 1960 to 1969, Somalia saw a slew of border conflicts and domestic political struggles that left Siad Barre as its leader. Barre, in 1970 declared Somalia a Socialist states with support from the Soviets. It seemed that Somalia was on the course for being a successful Soviet client state in a critical juncture of the world with ample coastline and a strategic asset over all. There was a sense of a “Greater Somalia” seemingly only when Barre took over and struggled to not only keep the ethnic Somali regions that were taken by Kenya but also reached out to annex the Ogaden region in Ethiopia. It was this attempted annexation that was the downfall as Somalia as a solidified nation.[iii]
Barre made a drastic miscalculation when he invaded the Somali-inhabited Ogaden region of Ethiopia in 1977. Barre had hoped for a “Greater Somalia” by bringing all Somalis in to the fold of a unified Somalia. Somalia was also just hit with a draught and Barre may have been attempting to acquire more fertile ground in Ethiopia. The Soviets in an odd twist of events opted to back Ethiopia, in turn soliciting the US to back Somalia over the Ogaden region. This fascinating conflict consisted of not only massive Soviet backing but also support (to include large numbers of troops) from supporters to include Cuba, North Korea, South Yemen and East Germany. The 8-month-long, war killed over half-a-million people and ended with Somalia retreating to the pre-conflict borders with its military ravished.[iv]
Not long after its state collapsed in 1991 followed by the Black Hawk incident was the withdrawal of nearly all international actors. Somalia has been off grid essentially for nearly two decades with seemingly small occasional engagement over the last decade. This complete disengagement left Somalia open to whoever had the bigger gun and for Somalia viewed as the most dangerous country in the world. However, it was 2006 that really began to bring the Somalia conversation to the table. The international community acknowledged that Somalia was a moment away from becoming the next Afghanistan – a geographical security vacuum where the likes of Al Qaeda or any negative influencer or violent actor could base itself.[v]
The assessment was too accurate. In 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) – a collection of Sharia Law businessmen with militias – decided to take governance into their own hands and push out the chaos-causing warlords, intent on establishing an Islamic rule of law – and they were successful in securing Mogadishu. The great irony was that Mogadishu for the first time in 15 years actually was stable. There was a rule of law, albeit mostly Sharia Law, certain basic services began to trickle in and Mogadishu’s air and seaports re-opened after remaining closed for over a decade. Essentially, it seemed that there was a fighting chance for at least the capital, Mogadishu to stabilize.
This situation was far from ideal in the international community’s eyes, specifically the United States and Europe, having just spent half a decade battling Islamic extremism and with two counterinsurgencies waging away in Iraq and Afghanistan. To the credit of Ethiopia and her Western backers, the ICU was far from a liberal organization – the rule of law was existent but it was violently strict. Also, the ICU were believed to be harboring a known terrorist responsible for his involvement in the US Embassy Bombings in sub-Saharan Africa. This was enough to convince the US and her allies that the ICU was not an option. [vi] This same year, Ethiopian troops began to engage the ICU to evict them from the capital effectively in December of 2006.[vii]
For all of 2007 and 2008, Ethiopian troops combined with African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), “a peace keeping mission operated by the African Union in Somalia with approval by the United Nations” secured the bulk of Mogadishu and surrounding southern Somalia.[viii] There was resistance however, from ICU and warlord remnants. In January 2009, Ethiopia withdrew its forces as planned. Immediately following their withdrawal, a new organization arrived to replace them: Al Shabaab. Al Shabaab is essentially a more violent, extremist splinter organization from the ICU. They believed forfeiting their power and territory was sacrosanct and were willing to engage in all means necessary to reclaim it. In 2009, the world watched painfully as Al Shabaab captures town after town, re-instilling their version of Sharia Law to include executing a full attack on Mogadishu.[ix]
As 2010 arrived, a famine had struck Somalia that would last for two years killing over a quarter million people. Simultaneously, Al Shabaab was wreaking havoc on any international organizations still present and the United Nation’s World Food Program had to withdraw from Al Shabaab controlled territory leaving little to no assistance to those starving from the famine. In February of 2010, in a not so surprising move, Al Shabaab declared its allegiance to Al Qaeda. This moment was arguably the lowest point in recent Somali history from the perspective of the international community. Essentially, all the gains made by the African Union and Ethiopian forces, were not only reversed back to essentially the ICU, but an Al Qaeda franchise who took over the entire southern part of the country to include the capital. The situation stayed essentially unchanged for all over 2010 and most of 2011 as onlookers watched to decide what to do next.[x]
One important thing did change however, though not on land. From 2009 through 2011, a piracy epidemic took hold. For three years, off the coast of Somalia piracy incidents to include hijacking and hostage for ransom skyrocketed to unprecedented levels. Considering the vital importance of the Gulf of Aden to global maritime transportation of all nations, this was a dire scenario. The global community immediately moved to act by deploying naval ships from several countries to the Gulf of Aden region and further out into the Indian Ocean to protect the shipping lanes. This was a watershed moment of global relations where the world saw actors as diverse as the US, Iran, Russia, India and China all come together to neutralize the threat. This maritime international intervention was a stellar success and in 2012, Somali piracy was virtually non-existent. This was for good reason – considering the World Bank calculated that Somali piracy was costing the global economy $18 Billion a year.[xi]
The result of Somali piracy was and still is a global collaborative effort to stabilize the country and its waters. The world’s navies came together to solve for the maritime threats and the worlds military, political and aid organizations came together to solve for the land issues. AMISOM countered the Al Shabaab threats on land in order to neutralize the factors that lead to piracy and the connection between piracy and Al Shabaab.
Back on land, Al Shabaab was excelling –partially due to funds from the piracy. Reports that Al Shabaab was even executing small-scale attacks in northern Kenya, led to Kenya’s deployment of military forces into southern Somalia in order to carve out a buffer zone.[xii] The 2012 year saw dramatic progress for Somalia. Al Shabaab began to lose ground by a combination of Kenyan forces from the south; African Union and Somali government forces from Mogadishu, US unmanned aerial vehicles from above and contingents of Ethiopian forces from the west. In August of 2012, Somalia swore in its first parliament in over twenty years. In September, the first Presidential election since 1967 occurred.[xiii]
The following year, 2013, continued on trajectory of rapid progress for Somalia. It began in January when the US recognized the Government of Somalia for the first time since the state’s collapse in 1991. Having a formal government with a relatively Al Shabaab free zone the international community now had a formidable entity to support. In April of 2013, the US successfully petitioned the UN Security Council to lift the arms embargo on Somalia making it now legal to provide arms to the new Somali military in order to retain their ground and defend against Al Shabaab forces. Since March 2014, AMISOM began an extensive clearing operation that has forced Al Shabaab to flee into the countryside while they simultaneously began executing high profile attacks in Mogadishu.[xiv]With chaos in Somalia as the back drop, it is easier to understand how and why piracy reared its ugly eye-patch.
Piracy existed notably off the coast of Somalia particularly since the state collapsed in 1991 however; it was not until 2006 when the International Maritime Bureau reported a significant increase of piracy incidents, ten in total. This was the first increase in three years. By the end of 2007, the International Maritime Bureau reported that piracy incidents had tripled – in just one year. The beginning of 2008 brought another significant increase in the first quarter alone; leading the European Union to call for “international efforts to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia”. A month later, the United Nations Security Council voted unanimously to permit naval vessels from nations affected, into the waters of Somalia. In August of the same year, the Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) is established by a coalition of navies belonging to Combined Task Force 150. Subsequently, in October of 2008 NATO deployed a naval force charged with patrolling the Somali waters.[xv]
On 8 April 2009, the renowned “Maersk Alabama” was hijacked by Somali pirates. This was the first American vessel to be subject to piracy in over 200 years. The US responded swiftly by sending in a Navy SEAL team to solve the problem. This event was later in 2013 turned into the movie “Captain Phillips”. The year 2009 proved to be a savage boon for piracy, with the number of piracy incidents more than doubling to 181. It was this year that Somali piracy became regularly reported on in the American media. The following two years, 2010 and 2011 showed no end in sight of the piracy problem. Incident numbers stayed about the same for 2010 and 2011 illustrated a small win with successful hijacking almost cutting in half but incidents overall only dropped by about fifteen incidents. This change in successful hijackings was probably due to increased on-board anti-piracy security measures – though the attempted hijacking still continued at an alarming rate.[xvi]
Then something happened and in 2012, there were only thirty-two incidents and only seven successful hijackings. As 2013 rolled into 2014, the final annual count only listed two incidents and no hijackings. Four months into 2014 there have been no hijackings and no incidents.[xvii] The reasoning behind this dramatic change, and arguably the death of Somali piracy as we have known it for the last half a decade, is a collaborative effort by the international community. What happened was actually rather remarkable in the sense that countries who were historical enemies began helping each other and working together to counter Somali piracy – and it worked.[xviii] Despite the three-year epidemic of piracy, it is critical to understand the two unintentional positive effects of piracy. The first being a dramatic transfer of wealth into Somali communities.
In absence of significant foreign aid to Somalia, and with little to no traditional means of income, Somalis turned to the one opportunity available to them – piracy. Despite the risk of death or imprisonment, “the 0.01 percent they might make — $30,000 on average — is 54 times the country’s average annual salary of about $550.”[xix] This cost-benefit analysis was basic economics according to Scott Carney of Wired Magazine who created an astonishing break down of Somali pirate economic analysis titled “Cutthroat Capitalism: An Economic Analysis of the Somalia Pirate Business Model.” In an extensive graphic breakdown of economic formulas and calculations made easy for the layman, Carney clarifies how piracy was the best decision a pirate could make. Looking at the societal impact it is also no wonder that piracy was supported during the peak years.[xx]
As piracy increased, so did the wealth transfer that moved millions of dollars from ransom payers to the pirates. As ransom money poured in “to Somalia, it [went] into the local economy, creating jobs and wealth and fueling micro economies along the coast.”[xxi]This significant transfer of wealth affected real estate development, sent basic wages through the roof, employed thousands and even created its own investment market.
As these micro-economies developed so did the number of those essentially employed by piracy. Despite a UN study that claimed 50% of the revenue went to financiers outside of Somalia, the amount of revenue that poured into traditionally impoverished pirate villages was staggering in comparison to their traditional income levels. Out of the estimated $400 Million that was paid to pirates, “about 30% of a ransom payment goes to pirates, 10% to their shore-based helpers, 10% in gifts and bribes to the local community and 50% to financiers and sponsors, who are generally based abroad.” The same report “estimated that 10,000 to 15,000 people are employed by the pirates indirectly in related industries such as boat repair, security, and food provision. (Other enterprising Somalis have set up special restaurants to cater to the hostages.)”[xxii]
With increased revenue entering Somali pirate towns, wages began to skyrocket. In one particular village, “the daily wage increased from 40,000 Somali shillings in 2005 to 120,000 in 2011 […] this is likely to reflect both direct employment opportunities and investments into local businesses.” In the graphic below, it is illustrated how high the wages exploded beginning and continuing from the start of piracy in 2008 and 2009. [xxiii]
Aside from wage increases, piracy revenue had such an impact on Somali pirate town economies that a rather robust stock exchange of sorts was set up for investment into the industry.[xxiv] As one wealthy former pirate stated “we decided to set up this stock exchange. We started with 15 ‘maritime companies’ and now we are hosting 72 […] the shares are open to all and everybody can take part, whether personally at sea or on land by providing cash, weapons or useful materials … we’ve made piracy a community activity.” A town official even added that “piracy-related business has become the main profitable economic activity in our area and as locals we depend on their output […] the district gets a percentage of every ransom from ships that have been released, and that goes on public infrastructure, including our hospital and our public schools.”[xxv] The outcome is that “[p]iracy has changed [the official’s town of] Harardheere from a small fishing village to a town crowded with luxury cars.”[xxvi]
The visual signs of the growth were apparent also. Community real estate development increased. In January 2012, BBC published an article summarizing a Chatham House report published the same month, titled “Treasure Mapped: Using Satellite Imagery to Track the Developmental Effects of Somali Piracy.” Chronological comparisons of pirate towns illustrated the growth over the years. Daytime satellite imagery analysis illustrated that the pirate town of Garowe for example almost doubled in size from 2002 to 2009.[xxvii]
The benefit was not limited to pirates. In an odd turn of events, piracy has benefited the local fishing industry. Whereas before large oversized foreign fishing vessels would troll through their fishing waters catching the fish faster than they could be replenished. Now, with the fear of piracy in the nearby shore waters rarely does anyone come through anymore. This has left a significant increase in the supply of fish for the local fishermen and their communities. Fishermen now can catch upwards to £200 a day whereas before they averaged under £5. Even the sizes of the fish have been reported to be the largest catches in 40 years.[xxviii]Somali economies significant alteration was the immediate positive effect. It was not however the only positive effect – another more global and lasting consequence was just beginning.
As the world began to focus on solutions to Somali piracy, they first began with counterpiracy and maritime security methods. Security contractors who historically worked in Iraq and Afghanistan began offering solutions to Somalia piracy.[xxix] According to the British Parliament, “the proportion of successful attacks has fallen dramatically, due to a combination of self-defence measures and the effects of the naval patrols”.[xxx] There is no question that increased offshore security measures decreased the number of successful pirate attacks as you can see in the graphic below.[xxxi]
However, the number of attempts did not decrease as fast, leaving the international community to require a solution to causes of piracy as a whole – onshore.[xxxii] Despite “military vessels from NATO, the European Union, Russia, China and dozens of other countries patrol the Indian Ocean waters” the consensus for an onshore solution continued to build as analysis clarified that “[a]ll the experts agree that the only long-term solution to the problem of piracy is to restore law and order on land.”[xxxiii][xxxiv]
For three years, off the coast of Somalia piracy incidents to include hijacking and hostage for ransom skyrocketed to unprecedented levels. Considering the vital importance of the Gulf of Aden to global maritime transportation of all nations, this was a dire scenario. The global community immediately moved to act by deploying naval ships from several countries to the Gulf of Aden region and further out into the Indian Ocean to protect the shipping lanes. This was a watershed moment of global relations where the world saw actors as diverse as the United States, Iran, India and China all come together to neutralize the threat. This maritime international intervention was a stellar success and in 2012, Somali piracy was virtually non-existent.to summarize the outcome of how Somali piracy brought the world together to solve for it, there is no better way to say it than by saying:
“[t]his is the irony of International Security Dynamics […]: ‘Piracy may be unique in international affairs for its ability to bring enemies together. Pakistan has saved Indian sailors from Somali pirates. China and Taiwan, same thing. The U.S. Navy saved Iranian sailors practically every weekend in January. Cats and dogs living together, mass hysteria, etc.’””[xxxv]
It is no coincidence that the peak years of Somali piracy coincided with the beginning of an integrated, international, intervention by the global community. The last great year of Somali piracy was 2011, that concluded three years of hyper-inflated piracy attack numbers and an increased number for the few years before that. The international aid response became highly apparent in 2011, which corresponded with foreign aid to Somalia to be roughly double of the average aid amounts for the half a decade prior.[xxxvi]
Back on land, Al Shabaab was excelling – partially due to funds from the piracy. Reports that Al Shabaab was even executing small-scale attacks in northern Kenya, led to Kenya’s deployment of military forces into southern Somalia in order to carve out a buffer zone.[xxxvii] The 2012 year saw dramatic progress for Somalia. Al Shabaab began to lose ground by a combination of Kenyan forces from the south; AMISOM forces from Mogadishu, US unmanned aerial vehicles from above and contingents of Ethiopian forces from the west. These exceptional security gains provided space for political progress all supported by the international community. In August of 2012, Somalia swore in its first parliament in over twenty years. In September, the first Presidential election since 1967 occurred.
The following year, 2013, continued on trajectory of rapid progress for Somalia. It began in January when the US recognized the Government of Somalia for the first time since the state’s collapse in 1991. Having a formal government with a relatively Al Shabaab free zone the international community now had a formidable entity to support. In April of 2013, the US successfully petitioned the UN Security Council to lift the arms embargo on Somalia making it now legal to provide arms to the new Somali military in order to retain their ground and defend against Al Shabaab forces.
What has been seen so far is a change in strategy and tactics by Al Shabaab. They have shifted from rebel groups holding territory to somewhere between insurgents and terrorists. There urban tactics resemble that of terrorism – dispersed high profile attacks. However, their forfeiting of urban space to avoid direct force-on-force conflict in order to flee for the countryside and launch attacks from there is a shift to insurgency. The likely approach will be the combination of the two and will have lasting impact. Al Shabaab is never going to be a conventional existential threat to the Somali state again; however, they will continue to pose a threat via terrorist methods bordering on insurgency. In April 2014, it was announced that Somalia would be deploying troops to assist with stability in South Sudan. This is a rather large step in Somalia’s security paradigm when it is able to export security.[xxxviii]
Beginning in March 2014, AMISOM initiated a sweeping campaign to oust Al Shabaab. The operation has been ongoing for about 7 weeks now. Al Shabaab has been effectively expelled to the countryside. However, they continue with high profile terrorist attacks in the capital of Mogadishu – albeit this is far better than an active insurgency or full-scale territorial control. The international community has planned what they call Vision 2016. This plan is to have fully democratic elections by 2016 with the security environment relatively stable.[xxxix]
The Somali piracy boom is over, and the numbers are the lowest they have been in several years even prior to the explosion of hijackings. As of February 2014, “1,435 suspected Somali pirates or their financiers are now in custody or jail in 21 countries.”[xl]With Somali piracy in the rear-view mirror, we can finally assess the ramifications from it. This paper is about irony, but positive irony at that. Somali piracy, executed by some of the most marginalized people on the planet, managed to affect the entire global economy and in effect alter global foreign policy for the better. It illustrates how even negative events in history often can bring about positive change. Somalia is developing and stabilizing at a rapid rate due to the extensive aid and assistance from the international community. When popular hotel resorts return to Somalia, the international community will be vindicated in all their sacrifices – but do not forget to thank the pirates.
Works Cited
[i] Kermeliotis, Teo. “Somali Pirates Cost Global Economy ‘$18 Billion a Year'” CNN. Cable News Network, 12 Apr. 2013. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.
[ii] “Somalia Profile.” BBC News. N.p., n.d. Web. 21 Apr. 2014.
[iii] “Somalia Profile.” BBC News. N.p., n.d. Web. 21 Apr. 2014.
[iv] “Somalia Profile.” BBC News. N.p., n.d. Web. 21 Apr. 2014.
[v] “Somalia Profile.” BBC News. N.p., n.d. Web. 21 Apr. 2014.
[vi] Fergusson, James. The World’s Most Dangerous Place: Inside the Outlaw State of Somalia. London: n.p., 2013. Print.
[vii] “Somalia Profile.” BBC News. N.p., n.d. Web. 21 Apr. 2014.
[viii] “AMISOM – African Union Mission In Somalia.” AMISOM. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2014.
[ix] “Somalia Profile.” BBC News. N.p., n.d. Web. 21 Apr. 2014.
[x] “Somalia Profile.” BBC News. N.p., n.d. Web. 21 Apr. 2014.
[xi] Kermeliotis, Teo. “Somali Pirates Cost Global Economy ‘$18 Billion a Year'” CNN. Cable News Network, 12 Apr. 2013. Web. 21 Apr. 2014.
[xii] “Timeline: Attacks in Kenya since Offensive against Al-Shabaab.” Sabahi RSS. N.p., n.d. Web. 21 Apr. 2014.
[xiii] “Somalia Profile.” BBC News. N.p., n.d. Web. 21 Apr. 2014.
[xiv] Kay, Nicholas, and Johnnie Carson. “Progress or Peril in Somalia?” Progress or Peril in Somalia? US Institute for Peace, Washington, DC. 22 Apr. 2014. Speech.
[xv] “Timeline: Pirates.” Infoplease. Infoplease, n.d. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.
[xvi] “Timeline: Pirates.” Infoplease. Infoplease, n.d. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.
[xvii] “Infographic: Somali Piracy Has Almost Been Eradicated.” Statista Infographics. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2014.
[xviii] “Timeline: Pirates.” Infoplease. Infoplease, n.d. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.
[xix] “Where Does Somali-Pirate Ransom Money Go?” International Business Times. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.
[xx] Carney, Scott. “Cutthroat Capitalism: An Economic Analysis of the Somali Pirate Business Model.” WIRED. N.p., 13 July 2009. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.
[xxi] Harress, Christopher. “Where Does Somali-Pirate Ransom Money Go?” International Business Times. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.
[xxii] “Somalia: Failed State, Economic Success?” : The Freeman : Foundation for Economic Education. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.
[xxiii] “Piracy ‘boosts Somalia’s Economy'” BBC News. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.
[xxiv] Hsu, Jeremy. “Somali Pirate Exchange Lets Investors Bet on Hitting a Ransom Jackpot.” Popular Science. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.
[xxv] Ahmed, Mohamed. “Somali Sea Gangs Lure Investors at Pirate Lair.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 01 Dec. 2009. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.
[xxvi] Jorisch, Avi. “Today’s Pirates Have Their Own Stock Exchange.” The Wall Street Journal. Dow Jones & Company, n.d. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.
[xxvii] “Piracy ‘boosts Somalia’s Economy'” BBC News. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.
[xxviii] “The ‘benefit’ of Somalia’s Pirates.” Channel 4 News. N.p., 25 Oct. 2009. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.
[xxix] Pentland, William. “Blackwater Floats Private Navy To Fight Pirates.” Forbes. Forbes Magazine, n.d. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.
[xxx] “House of Commons – Piracy off the Coast of Somalia – Foreign Affairs Committee.” House of Commons – Piracy off the Coast of Somalia – Foreign Affairs Committee. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.
[xxxi] “Infographic: Somali Piracy Has Almost Been Eradicated.” Statista Infographics. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2014.
[xxxii] “Infographic: Somali Piracy Has Almost Been Eradicated.” Statista Infographics. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.
[xxxiii] Sapa. “FEATURE: Somali Piracy Profits Go to Investors.” Top Stories. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2014.
[xxxiv] “Somalia: Counting the Cost of Anarchy.” BBC News. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Apr. 2014.
[xxxv] Scott, Brandon. “Iran’s Counter-Piracy Efforts.” Soldier Spook Statesman. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2014.
[xxxvi] OECD. “Country Programmable Aid: Partner Countries.” Somalia Country Page. OECD, n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2014.
[xxxvii] “Timeline: Attacks in Kenya since Offensive against Al-Shabaab.” Sabahi RSS. N.p., n.d. Web. 21 Apr. 2014.
[xxxviii] “#Somalia Troops Deploying to #SouthSudan.” Soldier Spook Statesman. N.p., n.d. Web. 21 Apr. 2014.
[xxxix] Kay, Nicholas, and Johnnie Carson. “Progress or Peril in Somalia?” Progress or Peril in Somalia? US Institute for Peace, Washington, DC. 22 Apr. 2014. Speech.
[xl] Sapa. “FEATURE: Somali Piracy Profits Go to Investors.” Top Stories. N.p., n.d. Web. 23 Apr. 2014.
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