The humanitarian situation in Afghanistan is one thing. It speaks for itself. But the implications to Americans from it, is massive. It is one element that is crucially being ignored by the US Government (Publicly) and the US media. Former employees and contractors of the US Embassy, US Military bases, US Intelligence and US non-profits are prime intelligence targets for the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and Iranian Intelligence.

I hesitate to note the vulnerabilities here to avoid facilitating adversarial advances, but I hope that this will lead to further action by the USG to evacuate SIV/P1/P2/P3 applicants, to avoid this. The specific placement, access and motivation of the local Afghan nationals who have worked for the USG put them in specific situation that makes them not only targets of reprisal, but also bonanzas for intelligence collection.

The results of this will lead to USG adversaries torturing, interrogating, and manipulating – to include sensitive site exploitation (digital and document extraction - our former allies to provide full biographical data and identifies on all former co-workers. This alone will provide a fiesta of data that is the gift that keeps on giving. Each lead will lend itself to another lead, and another, and another.

Once all elements of the network are completed, the adversarial extraction of information will multiply. The ability to process and analyze this data to make it applicable is unlimited. In short order, the United States’ greatest adversaries will be able to fabricate – in detail - the following demographics:

1. All US personnel almost-ever in Afghanistan. All passport and visa information of all US staff – Soldiers, Diplomats, Spooks, etc., are now at the mercy of the Taliban and whomever they opt to share or sell the data with. The Taliban now own all Afghan border information. They literally have my iris scans, fingerprints and passport data.
2. The biographical data, and personal information of every US staff member connected with Afghan local staff. Facebook profiles, phone numbers, emails, LinkedIn profiles and professional histories, full names, etc. Keep in mind, we are friends with these people and have signed off with signatures and contact information on all their paperwork.
3. The TTPs (Tactics, Techniques and Protocols) for US military Base and US Embassy access. The people we left behind know the word-by-word polygraph procedures for gaining entry to our military, diplomatic and intelligence facilities. They know our security protocols, applications details, and database methods. They not only know this information that is now available to the Taliban but is now up for the highest bidders such as China, Russia, North Korea and Iran – not to mention affiliate terrorist groups such as Haqqani, Al Qaeda and ISIS.

​Information does not stagnate in these circles. It sells, spreads, and grows. In short order, it will be in the hands of China – whom already has US full data on all individuals who have Security Clearances since the early 2000’s, to which they can cross-reference it. Couple this with data available on the open market for a fraction of the cost of a nation state – that includes data-leaks of Experian, Marriott, and airline data - that has all been hacked.

There is nothing to stop a letter showing up at my mother’s door threatening her if I do not cease and desist my work. There is nothing to stop me from being pulled into “secondary screening” in any number of countries that will soon have access to this data. There is nothing to stop my closest Afghan allies to be interrogated until they give up my biographical data, personal email, physical description, and professional title.

Thus, limiting my ability to ever travel abroad to anywhere but Western Europe, for example. Additionally, every single military, diplomatic and intelligence post around the world is now compromised with the key details on how to gain employment within, while surpassing Vetting and Investigative obstacles to protect our assets abroad.

None of this speaks to the fact that the Taliban reportedly have access to our biometric databases that identify our Afghan partners. To be clear – in many cases, our Afghan partners were not far off interpreters, but in may cases, embedded within the core of our diplomatic, intelligence and military units. Leaving these people behind is akin to leaving Americans with security clearances being at the mercy of Taliban interrogators.

Afghanistan is not some far off place with no relevance. Afghanistan is here – in America – at home. It is closer to you t

​I have been following to some degree the follow up of the breakdown in communication during the 6JAN Capitol riot. Which is something I think few people do - follow up on events. Some takeaways so far I think are critical.

1) There is significant lack of transparency with reporting and delays. And it is not subtle. Within the Capital Police chain of command we have on record, two people claiming two different narratives, with an hour gap difference. Like blatantly conflicting each other during testimony. This hour gap in effect, was the entire core of the event and two leaders disagree on who reported/requested what, and when.

2) Organizational blaming is rampant in this between Capitol Police, DOD and FBI and DHS, etc. Circular back and forth who sent what email when and how was it highlighted or not highlighted. That lack of clarity at the organizational level is merely an amplified version of the individual level noted above and further muddies the truth of what happened that day.

3) It is fascinating to see how America as a whole seems to shift blame around depending on the incident. After 9-11-01, there was ample blame placed on the USG - namely the Intel Community. It was so much so, that it seemed the actual attackers were not blamed but the victim was blamed. Ironically, following the 6JAN attack, we saw the opposite. The attackers were blamed but no one put any responsibility on those responsible for creating such a vulnerable target. This is more of a critique of America's Blame Culture, however. One where the purpose of analysis is not on truth or future prevention or even accountability, but scapegoating an easy target to make evil. Responsibility thus is not on anyone if you can find the enemy to blame. But real world dynamics do not operate like that. Blame is not a real thing, but in fact a complex combination of opportunity and intent.

4) As we can see with this article, DOD was highly hesitant to involve themselves with domestic issues, due to the blowback they got from the Summer 2020 unrest - mostly BLM and ANTIFA. So keep in mind, when you critique a response to one side, you are influencing the future response to the otherside. Instead of taking that responsibility, the folks who created that situation instead, used their own result as a further attack "why was there no crack down on 6JAN as there was on BLM?! Clearly this is racism!" No, this is the result of what you get when you put the respondent under public scrutiny:

"Robert G. Salesses, the Pentagon’s acting assistant secretary for homeland defense and global security, testified that defense officials’ tight control over the response to the Capitol — and reluctance to issue quick approvals — was shaped by controversy they faced in responding to civil unrest surrounding racial-justice protests last year.

“The memo was unusual in that . . . it required me to seek authorization from the secretary of the Army and the secretary of defense to essentially even protect my Guardsmen,” Walker said.
​
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/capitol-riot-hearing/2021/03/02/a4867a48-7b81-11eb-85cd-9b7fa90c8873_story.html

​"Free Market" is not a carte blanche thing that can be thrown around when we do not live in a free market economy. I know this whole "they are a private company" thing is always the retort for crazy right wing Trumpers pissed their Q-Anon memes get blocked or noted with a warning. Totally get it.

It is especially funny when it comes from that camp of right-wing trump dudes decrying commie threats all the time. I scoff at that too. Like hey bud, you cannot complain about socialism while also complaining about free market private company decisions. That works in the paradigm of this vs. that, in a vacuum.

But that is not how it works in reality. In reality, USG has its hand in free market a massive amount. The best example is the anti-trust case against FB now. If the USG - and as such the will of the people, in theory - can demand FB cannot be a monopoly or engage in nefarious activities, then the same is true for how they respond to freedom of speech.

In fact, the latter of those two is more important I reckon. Every company in this "Free market" economy is bound by city, county, state, federal and international laws. That alone means it is not an *absolute* free market. So dropping "private company" and "Free market" is not some panacea as answer to complaints of potential violations of freedom of speech (as theory or law) or biased implementation of such.

The inconsistent application of rules by FB, et al, but FB mostly, is non-negotiable. I have seen it a bunch of times, and tested it out. And my assessment is that it does lean left. I am not saying far left, but definitely a bit over the line. Additionally, even if it is not inconsistent, it is still inaccurate. My two hits for Hate Speech is solid evidence of that. That inaccuracy is evidence enough to warrant a change in the application.

Even if we were to wipe away the paragraphs above. And let us just say that their application is not biased, and they are a private company so whatevs. Even with that, I would posit that like cigarette ads, FOSTA, SESTA, etc, that the USG and thus the people, have determined that in some cases, the invisible hand needs to be visible.

In the case of internet stuff versus such as a bakery for example, these platforms have ceased to be voluntary platforms. There are jobs you cannot apply to without LinkedIn. Logging into legitimate accounts needed, are often bias towards using your Google or Facebook to login. There are places that do not accept cash. And there is a thin line thus, between having 2 options (Credit/Debit and Apply/Google Pay) and having 1 – Apple/Google.

These internet platforms such as Facebook, Google, Wikipedia, Airbnb, Twitter, LinkedIn, etc have surpassed convenience and though are not totally in the necessity column, they are on the cusp, with some in one column and some in the other. And soon, they will all be in the necessity column. There likely will always some recourse to operate off grid, but we all know, that is 1,000 times more difficult to do.

Additionally, when I posited my Microsoft banning people for using blacklisted terms, like Facebook and Twitter, and got some blow back on it, that blow back missed the point.

Remember when Google Plus existed. Imagine if it was successful and you had the same situation with Facebook. But Google hosts more needed things – like email. And now you are banned from your email. Totally within their rights. There is nothing that says Microsoft cannot ban you from using words in Word on your own computer.

Sure, you can argue that you paid for it, but people already pay for Facebook and Twitter via their data, for solo private accounts, and via paying for ads as an example for business accounts. And, Parler surely paid Amazon for their services and got kicked off. So the idea of paying for a service as a way to negate them to block or ban you for violating their T&S is false.

Additionally, one can argue that you need to read the T&S. Well, WhatsApp just changed theirs. So that logic is false too, because they change ALL THE TIME. And if you are invested in that platform as a individual or business it is very difficult to uninvest. People have built entire business models off of these platforms. Shit, I have had start ups go to shit because of T&S or API changes. If I got banned from Facebook total, I would be fucked. Messenger is my primary communication tool. And that includes work stuff often.

Airbnb just blocked nearly every reservation in DC because they are trying to avoid violent protesters from coming. Only if you have a long term stay or medical need can you come. Well, shit, what about homeless brandon? Now I am fucked. And what if I got on Facebook and began to complain about that while living in my care. And Facebook is how I share a GoFundMe to pay for a hotel room for myself? Then Facebook bans me because I used colorful language in my “Friends Only” post or sub-comments and now I am truly fucked.
​
So no, “Free Market” and “private company” is absolute bullshit. These platforms have spent billions ensuring their product and services replace original ones. They are no longer only private companies. They are crossing over into public goods – and that was their choice, and perhaps, they need to regulated as such when it comes to socio-political bias, because they already are regulated in every other way.

​This was the worst coup ever.

The only shot fired was by a Capital Police Officer that killed a female protestor. One non-protester was killed, after the fact from injuries sustained during the event. Two people died from ancillary medical issues, likely due to stress and fear from the event, one person died because they accidently tased themselves during the event and thus had a heart attack.

Two pipe bombs were found – not at the Capitol Building but located at the Republican and Democrat Headquarters. Molotov cocktails were found also – again not at the capital but inside the vehicle of one protestor. Reportedly a man with a “long gun” entered the building. A long gun. Not a handgun, not an “assault rifle” and not an easily concealed MP5. Not a weapon that is easily concealed, and not a weapon that can fire rapidly at multiple politicians or security staff, nor a weapon that can easily reload, nor a weapon that is effective at close quarters combat. No, a long gun. Literally the worst weapon you can imagine to conduct a coup in this situation.

Incitement of Violence

Trump conducted a 4 hour long “Save America Rally” before the event. During the rally multiple people spoke. The closest thing to inciting violence was when Giuliani utilized the phrase “trial by combat.” Trump himself referenced marching to the Capitol Building 3 times. One of those times he added qualifiers to it, when he stated, “everyone here will soon be marching over to the Capitol building to peacefully and patriotically make your voices heard."

Despite this, Trump was immediately accused of telling, directing, ordering and motivating his supporters to go to the Capitol Building and attack them violently. Additionally, the narrative consistently refers to the event as a terrorist attack, coup, attempted assassination. These are strong words that have strong meanings.

Screaming protesters can be extremely dangerous. Unlike smaller groups or individuals, once in a mob – the larger it is, the more dangerous they can be. I would fear for my life if I believed an angry screaming mob wanted to harm or kill me. In fact, I have. One year before this event, I was at the US Embassy in Baghdad, Iraq.

This was a siege that was directed by Iran, and the thousands of “protesters” held the compound hostage for ~13 hours before a show of force arrived and the majority of the protestors departed. During this event, the attackers broke through the gates, and burnt down the gate guard buildings, while throwing Molotov cocktails and rocks at the walls, cameras and over the walls. This was a terrorist attack. It was well thought out, strategic and had a logical intent.

Strategy

The voting would have led to one of two outcomes. First, a review of votes, that may lean to towards Trump winning. Second, Trump not winning. For probability, there was a 50% chance Biden would win. And the other 50% that either Biden would win, or Trump would win. Trump’s best chance of winning was to let the vote play out, and hope that his own Vice President and his supporters in Congress would agree to a review of the votes.

Trump had already faced impeachment once and knows he is the prime target of most domestic and many international, elements in the media and most of the political establishment – it has been his mantra since day one. It stands to reason that there is no doubt, that if Trump performed anything additionally significant to his current course of action of demanding recounts, that he would be targeted further.

If the options are to 1) direct a coup and become further a pariah in the last minute, that will without question not succeed in changing the vote outcome and potentially land him in jail or impeached; or 2) let the vote review continue, where he has supporters inside and could actually win; the first option is the opposite of what he supposedly wants.

In full disclosure, there are an additional two potential options that are outside of rational logic. Option 3 - he internationally incited the event, in hopes that it would lead to a national security emergency where most of the US government leadership is murdered or incapacitated, and Trump can somehow declare a domestic war against his own people and somehow manage to stay in power a bit longer. If this is the case, then Trump’s massive conspiracy to stage a coup, with a headpiece sporting a horned helmet and face-paint, was unsuccessful either way. Moreover, this would be the most strategic, ignorant plan of all possible plans.

The fourth potential option is that he knew he was not going to see another term, and thus decided to hit back with the most absurd chaotic, if-im-going-down-then-so-will-all-of-you option. If this was the option he chose, then it stands to reason there would be no holding back in his attempts to stoke and incite potentially the most daring domestic attack since September 11th, 2001.

The idea that Trump took option one seems unlikely. Option one indicates a fairly strategic attempt to achieve the opposite of what he wants: to win the election – thus being strategic to be unstrategic. The second option would potentially lead to Trumps ideal outcome. It would also potentially lead to an entire full term (barring a later removal). It is also the option that continues in synch with Trumps entire strategy all along – claiming election fraud before the election, untrusted mail-in ballots, fraud during the election, and extreme bias after the fact and betrayal by Pence on the day of.
The third option

The second option, pressuring Congress to conduct a review was the only option of all four to achieve a second term
​
Conclusion

Nothing in this writing means Trump is innocent of being divisive, knowing his words will or have motivated people into violence. Nothing in this writing asserts that Trump should not be impeached, nor does it counter the idea that Congress should invoke the 25th amendment. 

​This is the growth we are seeing - world-wide. And as I am writing this it jumped to over 212,000. At this rate, assume you will probably get this, & your loved ones will too. Depending on your demographic, you will experience somewhere along a spectrum of no symptoms or issues, to pneumonia in bed for 2 weeks, to death. There will be a global quarantine for at minimum 1 month. The economy will stay crap and services will begin to be prioritized. At best, over the next 90 days things will normalize, assuming we have a vaccine/cure.

The vast majority of the world has no system in place like developed countries do, and they will be hit hard. The one thing they do have though, that we tend to not, is the ability to operate without regularly functioning luxuries like we are used to. I am no survivalist guru, but with 20 years of military and intelligence experience and study, coupled with extensive travel and living in some of the most austere regions of the globe, this is my advice for the average American.

Prepare:

Panic buying toilet paper and hand sanitizer is not a solution long term. Though building a bunker and stocking guns may be a bit extreme on the other end; planning for 2-8 weeks of limited civilization, likely under government enforced curfews and aid delivery, is more reasonable for the average American.

Prepare to operate without toilet paper, that means having a hose or bidet-like solution. For the record, the vast majority of the rest of the world does this already as standard. Americans do not, and it will come to bite them in the ass (pun intended). Grabbing now the tools and equipment for this should be fairly easy - you can see some directions here.

Instead of panic buying absurd things, try to focus on stable items that will last, and that you will eat anyway. Aim for pasta and rice. Plus-up your seasonings and some canned goods like tuna and sauces to provide some diversity. I once lived off trail mix for a week on the island of Socotra off the coast of Somalia. Trust me, even tasty trail mix begins to taste bad after a few days.

Law Enforcement and Military will likely be providing security, but people tend to do crazy shit when they think it's the apocalypse. So relying on them to handle minor things like break-ins and theft is not wise. Ensure your locks and security systems are up to date and used. Run through security methods and reactions with your household now. What to do in case of a home intruder, what to do in case of a fire, what to do in case of a medical emergency. This can be done in as little as a couple hours. Do some role play with it to engrain this in your family's brains.

It would be wise to have ample sources of light on the offhand chance of a follow on disruptions - say, everyone in your neighborhood sitting home using air conditioners and the power goes out. It is not some prepper madness, to ensure you have some chemlights, flashlights and batteries. be prepared for power to go out for up to 24 hours. Chemlights are cheap and effective. But if you have kids who eat tide pods, please ensure they don't eat these - no they will no glow if they do.

If you can take out enough cash, for an emergency it is recommended. This does not mean making a run on the banks. This means, have say $500-$3,000 depending on your financial situation, in cash, in a safe place.

Ensure you have bleach. You can go all full prepper mode and get a LifeStraw or water sanitization tablets (I have) but for the average American just knowing the bleach-to-water ratio for cleaning water to drink is enough in case we have a water disruption for any reason. Read about it here.

Prioritize:

The economy was doing great, but still many Americans are in no great condition financially. Prioritizing your needs with your resources is critical. If someone requires medication, that should be your first thing you try to stock up on now. Doctors can prescribe 90+ day amounts if you are going overseas or on vacation. I imagine, explaining that you are doing something like that, should be able to get your a prescription for that.

I am a fan of sticking through with investments currently, as I feel the economy will rebound, but you you should review what your current expenses are, and see which ones you can turn off. Clearly Amazon Prime Video and Netflix are required. We are not savages.

However, if you have some luxury expenses, especially recurring, say those stupid monthly box programs with "Guy Stuff" or whatever, it may be wise to pause these sorts of things for now depending on your financial situation. It took months to years even, for the economy to rebound after 2001 and 2008, begin preparing for this now just in case. Austerity is key.

Plan:

Contact your family members now, and confirm what their plan is if things continue on this glide path. Will they stay at home and hunker down, or will they opt to depart urban centers for the summer house in the rural areas? Have the plan decided already. Confirm your loved ones also have or will prepare as noted above.

Most planning does not require a massive military planning team - it just requires a conversation hitting some key points and making a short To Do list. Just running through what situations may arise 2, 4 or 6 weeks from now is more than most do their entire lives.

Knowing that public and private services work fine, until 50% of the workforce is in bed with a fever, changes your outlook greatly. So, get your house together. Clean out the trash, organize your stuff and assume you will likely be providing services for yourself.

Ensure you have an SMS or online messaging group set up for your loved ones, and your neighbors. This ensures rapid collaborative communication in case of an emergency. Check with your neighbors to have a conversation on plans and see if they need help with something. A family member, friend or neighbor, rapidly becomes a liability for your if they did not plan.
Prepare your will. Do not be daft. You should have one anyhow. If not, I do not recommend going out and searching for lawyers now. You can do this all online in a short period of time for a fee, over at LegalZoom. Take serious stock in your relationships and use this time to get on a call or video chat or email follow ups with your friends and loved ones.

Perform:

Stay the fuck home. Read your books. Work on the six-pack abs you always wanted since you ordered P90x that night drunk back in 2011. Watch your health. Both physical and mental. Take your Flintstones, stay active moving around in your home and on your property. I am writing this confined to a government compound overseas and I love me a good scotch. But I am doing my damnedest to wash/sanitize my hands regularly, and taking vitamins.
​
Do not become the liability for something unrelated to Covid-19. In that sense, maybe don't start up that P90x - you may hurt yourself. Follow up with people living alone. Check on your neighbors. Watch Stand Up comedy. Stay positive. For most Americans you have never experienced times of real distress, war, natural disaster, social upheaval, etc. Some have, and they are more resilient because of it. But check on yourself and your loved ones.

If our soldiers can spend a year at war and survive, the average American stay-at-home mom and office worker can get through this. If you are alone, losing your shit, and have no one to talk to. Get online and find an online therapist - many insurance companies cover this. There are Facebook groups out there too. Your sanity and those around you, can rapidly become a liability when it goes to shit.

Austerity. Endurance. Resiliency. Stick to those, and we will survive the zombies. Speaking of zombies, stock up some guns in your bunker. Fuck it, better safe than sorry.

Further Reading:

If things get worse, and we have a lot going on in the world. Some education will go a long way. Years ago I spent a couple days learning urban survival under Tim MacWelch of Advanced Survival Training in Virginia. He has a lot of great resources and guidance at his blog: https://www.outdoorlife.com/tags/survival/
For a great book by one of my favorite authors, see if you can order before Amazon stops non essential deliveries, Emergency by Neil Strauss. You can find it here: https://www.amazon.com/Emergency-This-Book-Will-Save/dp/0060898771/
Caveat: This is a brief off the cuff write up. I will try to add to it if I have time.

It pains me to see how loud socio-political sectarianism is in America, considering our media platform has far greater reach than any other one. When a demographic in the US screams, the world hears it. I have seen evidence of the rest of the world believing in a "gun culture" in America - immigrant social media groups saying they fear being shot if they come to the US, etc. This concept of a gun culture is a myth. It also is a near-sectarian sub-demographic that is loud.

In my 37 years I have spent about 27 of them in the US - in over 40 states inclusive of the far flung such as Hawaii and Alaska. I have lived in at least 5 of the states. Yet, this massive gun culture spoken of eludes me. I have only seen guns a handful of times.

Aside from Law Enforcement, Security and Military, I have seen a few people with guns in their own homes. A good example of this was my father who owned a few - I think one pistol, one rifle and one shotgun. I think I have only seen them used once as a child in North West US (where guns are far more tolerated).

Though some estimates put the number of guns in America as over 300 million - or that of our population. From a subjective experience they are not being carried around in public or flaunted in any way shape or form. Numbers however reveal that ownership by home is only at roughly 30% of American homes. Numbers also reveal this is mostly in rural areas.

Considering most people I have met with guns, tend to own plural, I would estimate that there are not 300 million people owning guns, but a small segment in mostly rural areas who own many guns. By age alone, you can assess that 20% of the country likely does not own a gun, because they are too young or too old. There is no reason to believe that that that 20% is not represented equally across gun owning and non-gun owning households.

Thus 20% of the 30% of gun owning households, are too young/old to even own guns - leaving say 26% of people with ownership. Without running numbers of those not able to own guns - those under state control (mental facilities, prison, etc) we can further whittle this number down even more. I would speculate that would cover at least another 6% of the population. Ergo we are looking at no more than 25% of the population, clustered in rural areas and being multi-gun owners.

​Additionally, in my experience most gun-savvy gun-loving owners in rural areas are extremely gun-wise. It seems these people are not likely to be conducting crimes with guns. So we are not looking at a massive gun culture menacing from sea to shining sea. We are looking at most guns being owned by a niche group of people, while most crimes committed by another niche group of people.

Criminal statistics aside, the niche-ness of ownership highlight how the purported gun culture is a myth. You can easily live your entire life in America never seeing a gun in person unless you see a law enforcement officer. Those in America projecting this notion of a gun culture not only skew the domestic debate with scare tactics but they are damage our image abroad as gun toting fanatics.

*https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/10/22/facts-about-guns-in-united-states/
*https://www.npr.org/2016/01/05/462017461/guns-in-america-by-the-numbers

Recently, the US Embassy in Baghdad, Iraq posted a Facebook post announcing the cessation of Consular activities (Visas, Passports, etc.) due to the damage and continued threat from the New Years Eve and New Years Day Iranian-backed Iraqi militia/protester attack on the embassy.

As a veteran of Operation Iraqi Freedom II, a former State Department contracted Cultural Advisor of the last class of Iraqi YES Program students, and having spent roughly 2.5 years in the Baghdad Regional Security Office, I thought it would be important to share with my fellow Americans, 30 snippets from Iraqis who appreciate our sacrifices.

These snippets are comments on the US Embassy Baghdad Facebook post. When you think Iraq is a place we need to remove ourselves from, may I remind you that there are Iraqis who need and cherish our support and continued presence.

​As a reminder, the militia protestors at the embassy are the not same protesters who have been protesting in Baghdad for the last 3 months while getting gunned down by Iranian-backed security forces.
I hope you find these as touching as I did:

​

Firstly, this is definitely not a Muslim ban because at least 87.8% of Muslims are not included in it. Saying otherwise is factually ignorant and confusing feelings with facts. Do the math.

Additionally, this is a temporary suspension in is visa issuance and there are multiple exceptions to the "ban". Contrary to multiple people and articles saying otherwise - have they even read the State Department cable or the actual Executive Order?

The greatest take away for the action is that to vet potential individuals (from these locations) coming into the country and our embassies and bases around the world is nearly impossible. Most people chiming in on this this topic have no idea nor experience regarding the process of how that is done. If you have ever conducted vetting in these places you would know how poor the document collation and ability to validate them are.

The fact is, in Yemen,  Iraq, Somalia, Sudan and Libya - we have next to no ability to do an effective background check on nearly anyone. If this EO was targeting just places with high chances of nefarious actors then you would have the likes of Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan & Pakistan on them.

However, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have far greater domestic security organizations and thus they can collect, collate and share with us files on their people if they are nefarious (terrorists) - whereas the "governments" of Somalia, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Iran, Yemen & Syria are incapable or unwilling to do so. Afghanistan being an exception to this for more diplomatic reasons.

And if you are one of those people claiming this to have to do with Trump's business connections because the likes of UAE were not included in it you would be woefully wrong. If you have ever been to UAE you would know how exceptional their Law Enforcement and Intelligence services are at tracking travel and personnel within their borders. UAE frankly is better at this than the US.

If there is anything the execution of this EO is guilty of, it is horrible Strategic Communication (i.e. Public Relations) and a terrible implementation and clarity. Lawful Permanent Residents (LPR) aka Green Card Holders should definitely be removed from this policy - and the flip flopping on the topic illustrates the fact that most likely believe that.

The fact is, the US vetting industry has been left to whither while simultaneously being directed to perform exponentially more while their resources have been carved out. Once, I brought to the attention of my supervisor that I thought I identified a potential nefarious individual and the response I received was "Well, he is already in the States so that is not our problem."

​Furthermore, one terrifying quote from a USG official who is even more so intimately involved in this field, really brings home the terror - when the official was talking about the dysfunctional vetting program the official ended the conversation with "So you just bide your time until you mosey, then just hope you are armed, back home, when someone cooks off in a Safeway."

https://taskandpurpose.com/culture/6-types-contractors-encounter-overseas/​

In the US Embassy in Kabul there is a New York City Skyline model-memorial made from the steel of the World Trade Center columns. The other day I stared at it; standing in the atrium alone in quiet solitude, slowly running my fingers across the rough metal, wondering how much pain was melded into it. How much history embedded within it? How much future was dictated because of it — and the Global War On Terror, or GWOT.

My GWOT began in Bangkok. I was a Private in the US Army on mid-tour leave from South Korea. I had flown into Bangkok the night prior and by the time the planes hit their targets it was already late-evening in Thailand. I was several 24oz Heinekens into my night at a youth hostel, surrounded by fellow backpackers and local Thai hostel volunteers. At least three of the people there that night continue to hold a place in my life 15 years later.

Everyone turned to me as we watched the television and asked me, an American and US Army Soldier, what was going on — as if I had some red phone dialed into the White House with President Bush on speed dial. I was a Private for god’s sake. The following morning at the train station, all the English papers in their stacks at the news stand were screaming in capital letters “America Mobilizes for War!!”

It was terrifying. I tried to call back to my unit in South Korea to see if I had to return but I could not get through. I was away from the hostel for the 12th & upon returning that night I was told that US Embassy personnel came by to check on all the Americans and that the US Embassy had Armored Personnel Carriers in front of them. A week later I returned to South Korea where, at the airport the Korean National Police were walking around in combat gear with rifles.

I caught a bus from the airport to my town, Uijonbu where Camp Essayons, home of my Military Intelligence Battalion, was located. Hungover & jet-lagged from my R&R, I pulled up in a taxi at the front gate that normally was semi-inviting and non-aggressive, as far as pre-9–11 overseas military bases go; I saw 50 Caliber machine guns peeking out over barricades and armed Korean military and US guards and concertina wire surrounding it. I felt like I had just walked into a war zone. Or a Hollywood action set. This was the new normal.

I spent the next & last few months of my tour in South Korea pulling 12-on 12-off guard shifts, protecting the Ammunition Holding Area (AHA) where some 1,000 rockets lay stored, from terrorist attack. The notion at the time was that if terrorists blew up the AHA it would take out the entire town of Uijonbu with something like 200,000 citizens. I left Korea on January 1st 2002 to serve out the remaining 6 months on my two-year contract in Fort Huachuca, Arizona, the home of the Military Intelligence Training Center.

Upon arriving to Arizona, however, I learned I was stop-loss’ed & could not get out of the Army. In that short 13 months training Intelligence Officers, our military went from striking back at Al Qaeda in Afghanistan with a light foot-print to preparing for a full-scale invasion of Iraq. I re-enlisted and subsequently left Arizona to return to a combat unit, this time in Germany where I landed — the day we invaded Baghdad. I remember watching it on the news in the early morning in the barracks. I knew I would be there shortly.

I was supposed to serve a two-year service contract with the Army in a time of peace. Like many, if not most who signed up pre-9–11, that peaceful two-year tour became nearly 6 years active duty around the world in multiple countries and in combat. It then evolved into studying International Affairs at a university with a focus on Arabic, the Middle East & Islam, all the while being in the Army Reserves.

Then there were years spent as a contractor for the government, a tour in Baghdad, two gigs in DC with the Intelligence Community, a brief sabbatical in Yemen & four deployments to Afghanistan — where I am now — and where arguably the September 11th attacks spawned from.

I spent five September 11th anniversaries in Afghanistan including this one. The rest have been in Iraq, Yemen, DC or overseas as a soldier. My passport is a map of the Global War on Terror. Technically, I even studied abroad in Yemen & Afghanistan — the two birth places of Al Qaeda. My first adult tourist trip overseas was to Egypt — the home of Sayyid Qutb — arguably the modern father of “Islamic” extremism. The last 15 years of international security have been my life in so many ways.

As US Department of Defense jobs began to dry up the last few years, with Afghanistan forces drawing down I began thinking of the ‘Twilight of GWOT’ as I dubbed it. Every time I leave Afghanistan I think it will be the last. Though new jobs pop up they are no longer mass low-qualification types. They are mostly with State Department or in some small-footprint Special Operations or Intelligence field. Luckily these have been fields most of my experience is in — Intelligence, Strategic Communication & Security — but pickin’s are slim.

The War on Terror is not over & never will be. It will however, continue to evolve into Combined-Joint-Multinational-Soft Power “grey” engagements — otherwise known as Hybrid Warfare. But for those of us who served as warriors, diplomats, spies & aid workers in any fashion during the last 15 years — this is the twilight of GWOT as we know it.

We will be left with many memories but the most poignant will remain that September day — no matter where we were at the time. That day affected many different ways & my thoughts & prayers are always with the victims. For the first 21 months I spent deployed to Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan I kept a 9–11 flag with every name of the fallen on it, hanging next to my bed in my wooden “B-Hut”.

Many seldom think how much our lives were impacted by that day subsequently — in the small quiet ways. A few anniversaries ago I sat down and contemplated how much of my life was dictated by those attacks. I counted at least a two dozen lovers I had & lost, nearly every dollar I made, every dollar I lost. Almost every friend since that day, most of the books I read & places I visited. My entire university experience & chosen language to study. Every part of my life was given birth to that day — for better or worse. Therefore, no day passes I do not think of that day. There is no “Never Forget” for me. That would be like saying “Never Forget, Your Life.”

To all those who have sacrificed over the last 15 years for a better post-post-9–11 world I thank you. Whether you are the soldier, spook, statesman; scholar or aid worker overseas trying to expand Stability Multipliers to counter the drivers of the instability — I salute and thank you for being by my side and letting myself stand by your side, for the last 15 years.

Fifteen years of conflict, bases, FOBs, COPs, poor Wi-Fi, dead friends, missed family, lost friends, solitude, bottled water, porta johns, malaria pills, dust, sand-storms, CHUs, 0430hrs Call to Prayers, Toyota Land Cruisers, power outages, gunfire, explosions, spent brass, Monitoring & Evaluation, NGOs, Microsoft Outlook, MRAPs, HUMVEEs, cargo pants, sewage, fear, loneliness, Embassies, Consulates, immigration lines, airports, secondary screening, Reverse Culture Shock, PTSD, power converters, shitty local beer, seedy overseas parties, frozen Skype sessions, incoming fire — direct & indirect, lock-downs, alerts, alarms, The Big Voice, interpreters, acronyms, Kevlar, MREs, shitty air conditioners, Hescos, T-Walls, squat toilets, hand sanitizer, non-potable water, sweat, sand in places it shouldn’t be, sweat in places it shouldn’t be, 24/7 generator noise, shitty internet, dysfunctional cell phone connections, bureaucracy, visa stamps, passports, Dubai layovers, inshallahs and the general fuckery that is this way of life, that chose us.
​
We have never forgotten.

*Also published on Medium at https://medium.com/@BrandonScott361/15-years-the-twilight-of-the-war-on-terror-3935563b9e26

I remember not long after 9–11–01 when the Global War on Terror was broadcasted & its critics boasted the counter of “How can you fight (and win) a war on an idea?” There were many valid points to this question. How does one fight a war against a tactic of violence? How does one fight a war against Islamic Extremist beliefs?

After nearly 15 years of pondering this thought while working & living on the “frontlines” if you will, of the GWOT in places like Iraq, Afghanistan & Yemen and with the most recent attack in Orlando as fresh reminder of its continuance, I propose a different idea. The reverse should be the question we ask: How does Islamic terrorism fight a war on an idea? The fact is America is not a country it is an idea and it is not an American invention. It is a notion owned by a plethora of nations and organizations and people. It is one of liberty, diversity & equality.

Al Qaeda, Daesh & the like cannot win a war against this idea. A key symbol of this fact is how the new World Trade Center building has lit its spire in a rainbow color in support of the Orlando shooting. So after nearly 15 years since one of the most spectacular attacks in modern history the target of the attack is standing tall and expressing support for the most recent attack.

No, Islamic extremist cannot win its war against the idea of liberty & diversity. It can attack Istanbul, London, Sana’a, Paris, Sydney, New York, Baghdad, Brussels & Madrid. However you cannot kill an idea. The proof of concept is on extremism not on the harbingers of liberty. Our flexibility, inclusion & diversity is explicitly the foundation of our idea & the fundamental attribute that keeps us stable like an earthquake proof building. We sway & shake but never break.
​
The fact alone that we have a discotheque filled with LGBTQ peacefully celebrating Pride weekend is indicative of the nature of our idea. One that we do not need to impress upon others with violence though instead we broadcast the idea & it is “our home grown freedom fighters” around the world like Malala that you must struggle with; not the other way around.

In a previous writing I annotated how Somali Piracy saved Somalia in part due to its demand for global Actors to come together and work the way they should have in the first place, twenty-plus years ago. I argue the same is true for ISIS in Iraq. Arguably the primary issue with stabilizing Iraq from 2003 to 2011 was the lack of regional affiliates working together, instead they worked against each other. Saudi support for Sunni factions battled Shiite factions supported by Iran. This proxy warfare left the Coalition Forces and the Iraqi people stuck in the middle while paying the price dearly. Stabilizing Iraq without two regional power players fighting it out in the streets of Iraq would have shown to be far easier.

With the injection of ISIS into the Iraqi paradigm we are seeing a new Coalition made of the unusual allies: Syria, Iran, Iraq, the Kurds, Australia, Canada, the UK, France, Turkey, Jordan, the United States and now possibly China. The US State Department themselves have listed a good 62 nations who are assisting. If this joint commitment came in 2004, 2007 or even 2010 the current situation could very possibly been avoided. Instead we often saw Saudi support for Sunni militias, Iranian support for Shiite militias and Syrian (tacit) support for all things extremist to cross the border into Iraq.

Beating back ISIS is not as much of a problem as securing & stabilizing Iraq for a post-ISIS functioning state. It will be critical over the next 6 months that ISIS takes a beating that Syria ensures the Syria-Iraq border is one of the most secure in the region while simultaneously neutralizing ISIS elements on both sides of the border. The Kurds need to ensure they secure the areas currently under their control and surrounding their de facto borders. With Iranian training and advising supporting the Iraqi forces and American Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance and Special Operations support completing the equation, Iraq has a good chance of neutralizing the ISIS threat and getting back on track with their success in stability as they were in a pre-ISIS state.

More often than not, I find horrible events become the catalyst for global engagement in a way that in an odd twist of fate benefits the victim in a long run. The Taliban in the long run will be the cause for saving Afghanistan. 9-11 and global terrorism in the long run is the catalyst for change that will save the dark corners of the world by ramping up global actors to realize they cannot ignore those corners anymore. Somali piracy & Al Shabaab is the catalyst for change that is now saving Somalia. Evil brings out the light and in Iraq’s case, ISIS is the catalyst for change that Saddam and the subsequent insurgency should have been. It will bring together the world to engage with disconnection and instability. Once global actors become inextricably linked to an area they have no choice but to ensure long-lasting development.

Had ISIL not crossed the border into Iraq; progress would have continued albeit slowly. However, the bulk of the international community would have continued to operate lasse fair with little-to-no desire to involve themselves with the challenge. The current crisis however has ensured that multiple actors involve themselves with the troubled nation and barring any cold feet or political externalities, will achieve a lasting result. The worst events in history lend themselves to be catalysts to the next evolution in global affairs.

In 2004 I was a junior enlisted soldier working on a Human Intelligence Team in Iraq. In my headquarters unit back at home base we had a contractor who made something like 180k a year. He stayed on base, made bank, had good food and air conditioning while my team was running essentially 24/7 combat ops for 365 days. It sucked and it was grueling and I was jealous and directed my anger towards this contractor. 10 Years later I find myself deployed for my 4th time – 2nd as a contractor in Afghanistan and thinking back to how I viewed this man makes me feel ignorant, naïve & immature.

Pay: Yes they probably make more direct income than you. No they probably do not have the benefits as you – not even close. I have done the calculation and so have Government auditing agencies and it is far more expensive to deploy a soldier to war for a year than a contractor. On top of that if you calculate your total benefits – and lets not even include health – suddenly your salary goes up much higher. Consider adding your GI Bill benefits or Loan repayment benefits and training and food and full income including housing together and divide that by how many years you served and tell me again how a contractor making 120k for a year in Iraq or Afghanistan makes more than you.

Never ask how much they make. If anything this is good training for the civilian world where you generally do not know how much your supervisors and colleagues make. Only in government employee land are you able to accurately tell how much someone makes based off their rank albeit O-4, E7 or GS-14. People generally do not get out of the military and come back into it as a contractor because they love the work – often they need the work. Ask any contractor how much child support, college loans or alimony they pay every month and that will give you a better idea about whether contractors are rolling in cash.

Service: I cannot begin to count how many times someone asked me “You were in the Military??!!” I always responded with “No, I studied “Armyology” in college. Yes of course I was in the military you jackass, how else would I have gained the skills & clearance for this job. Nearly every contractor I have ever worked with – at least 9 out of 10 – were either prior service or still in the reserves. They will respect your service if you respect theirs.

Proficiency: Most contractor positions I have reviewed or worked on required at least a 4 Year degree and 4 years of experience plus a clearance or certification for that particular position. Few contractors “walked into” their position because they simply applied online. Most have a 4 year degree and at least a term of service under their belt which is more than you can say for probably 50% of the military that. This means they are probably fairly educated and skilled to do the job they were hired to do. Never try to compare your contractor to your Private by saying “this guy gets paid 150k to do a job that my Private does” – no, your private probably does not have a BA, Top Secret clearance & over a decade of experience in this field.

Camaraderie: My best time (and least paid) was my first 6 months deployed to Afghanistan with 1st Cavalry Division. The Director of our sections was Colonel who ensured the 3 civilians (two GS and one contractor) were always included in every unit function. This made us feel as part of the team, to a degree that we were in the unit, because quite frankly in a world of individual augmenters, contractors, civilian employees, guardsmen, reservists & cross-service joint ops; we were. This led to an amazing working environment where I had no problem working 15 and occasionally 18 hour days despite only being required to work 12 and only annotating 12 on my time sheet. I was part of that unit and my performance reflected this.

Contrast this when the new unit came in and the Director was now a LTC who banished civilians from unit meetings, VIP visit invitations and once straight up kicked me out of a meeting despite me being the SME on the topic that we were engaging. This guy ended up splitting the unit by effectively pushing out and marginalizing the civilians (at the time we comprised of roughly a third of the section) to the point of counter-productivity.

Continuity: I spent nearly 2 years on my first tour as a contractor in Afghanistan, my coworker who arrived a month after me (a GS Civilian Employee) ended up spending 2.5 years. I watched three units come through and each one changed everything they and often back again when they realized it did not work. We truly held the continuity of wisdom in that section. We had a longer memory and had attempted the same job multiple ways learning which worked and which didn’t. It would for lack of a better word behoove you to at least take into consideration your contractors’ advice
​
Herat, Afghanistan
Fall, 2014

Crime Pays, and piracy pays very well these days. Piracy is by far not a new issue.  In the first few years of the 19th century the United States had to send Marines to the shores of Tripoli to combat an enduring piracy problem. However, the last few years the world has been seeing a drastic increase in piracy off the East African coast. In increase to such an extent it has brought global adversaries together to combat the threat. Since 2007, the number of successful pirate attacks has increased nearly fourfold. There were a total of 293 pirate attacks worldwide in 2008, of which 38% occurred within the Gulf of Aden or off the coast of Somalia (Leader).

The Somali pirate industry is a dynamic one with flexibility and a learning curve. Those who have opted to participate in this international enterprise have made a cold calculated decision with regards to what’s best for them. Often thought of as terrorists and thugs, the decisions of those involved in the piracy are more apt to make rational decisions based off available observable data, following the patterns predicted by traditional economic models.

With a country in shambles and an economy disheveled, it is no wonder why Somali male youth turn towards piracy as a viable option for income. With a national literacy rate of 37 percent, few skilled workers and few industries, the average Somali male has no prospects for upward mobility in the socio-economic sphere (CIA). Individuals then choose to balance the dangers of entering the pirate lifestyle (risk) and the possible beneficial return on his ‘investment’ in the lifestyle (reward).

​The opportunity costs of staying in Mogadishu are low, thus increasing the incentive for individuals to take on the role of a pirate despite its dangers. There is nothing for them to gain if for example they stay in Mogadishu. They are aware of the estimated value of the average wage (if any) and they are aware of the estimated value of the pirate wage. Somalia is a nation of about 9 million people and a GDP/capita of $600 which is what the average Somali earns annually (CIA). Many of the low ranking pirates make almost $10,000 in one successful hijacking. At that reward, what is risk? “Never mind the risk; it's less dangerous than living in war-torn Mogadishu” (Carney).

The pirates have weighted the opportunity cost of the venture. The payoff these days is 100 times that which it was in 2005 and with the volume of potential victims increasing, so does the attacks on them. Between 2003 and 2005 the number of ships that passed through the Suez Canal grew approximately 1,000 a year for five years (Carney). It’s a growth market; and one that was highly untapped prior to the Somali piracy situation, and potentially with increasing returns.

Robbery never was much of a stranger to modern day Somalia, however the pirates have learned how much more profitable ransom extortion is instead. It’s all about choosing the option with a higher return, and with a 12 man operation costing a little over $30,000, despite needing to often conduct 3-4 attacks before you “get lucky once” (Carney). However, it is believed that most pirate cartels are financed by wealthy third country nationals, so startup capital is limited and either way at average rate of $1 million - $3 million per ransom payment, what does it matter if it takes 3 attempts at $30,000 before completing a successful one (Hunter) (Carney). The pirates have no way of knowing – at least in the beginning – how much ransom would be paid. So they follow the logical capitalist move and merely inflate the cost of ransom to see what is willing to be paid. This can be viewed as “price discovery” or “gauging how much the market will bear” (Carney).

Observing the pattern of pirate attacks chronologically you will see the arrival of Somali piracy on the global stage in early to mid-2007 when attacks increased enough to draw international media attention. The piracy continued increasingly so relatively unscathed until a year later in 2008 when European and US Naval forces began to patrol the waters along the shipping lanes. At this point there was little to no Western intervention, leaving the opportunity cost of continuing the piracy the same. This occurred as pirates were economical enough to re-invest their profits into future operations making them more successful and in turn letting them take on larger vessels and demand higher ransoms.

In the spring of 2009 however, an externality – and highly symbolic one at that –entered the picture as the response elicited from the US after pirates attacked the first of our ships and took a US hostage leading to the involvement of US Navy SEAL commandos and ending with three pirates dead and one detained (CNN). Some analysts may see the piracy boom coming to a bust shortly after incorporating the international pressure on ending the piracy situation. If pirates continue to get killed or captured as a consequence of the supply of Navy SEALs then the opportunity cost will surely be changed for the Somali pirate.

According to the statistical data however, this is not the case exactly. Pirate attack attempts have continued to increase in the Gulf of Aden region off the coast of Somalia; however the number of successful attacks has decreased. Coinciding with this behavior, statistics show us that pirate attacks have shifted their geographical market to as far as 1,000 nautical miles east of Somalia; and further south down the Somali coast. This tells us that the piracy simply could not stay in the market in the Gulf of Aden region and had to move elsewhere. There was also an observable price change from 2007 until 2009. The average ransom amount increased from $2-3 million to $4 million, respectively (Ahmed). This reflects the new scarcity of successful attacks.

For those willing to participate, however, there has been little change. The kill or capture of pirates for the purpose of neutralizing the piracy problem is feeble minded as the supply of able-bodied potential pirates is nearly limitless as the country’s demographic majority resides in the youth. Not to mention the porous state borders where refugees flow back and forth and often end up in refugee camps withering away from hunger and disease. These camps are ripe grounds for pirate recruitment. Often the pirates will even pay for the potential recruits travel from their hometown to the pirate ridden coastal towns.” A police chief of one of the pirate haven stated “Whenever 10 guys get paid ransom money, 20 more pirates are created.” Upon arrival to these pirate havens what impoverished Somali is not impressed with the flashy lifestyle of “shiny new cars” and “the millions of dollars worth of ransom money that have flooded ashore” (Harding).

​Algeria, 0930 hours, December 11th 2007: A suicide bomber blows the front off a building that was home to the Algeria's Constitutional Council. Barely ten minutes later, another bomber attacked a United Nations building using a “truck containing 1,800 pounds of explosives” effectively leveling part of the structure. The death total was forty-two people,”including 17 U.N. employees” with another 158 other injured courtesy of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb or AQIM.[i]

North Africa is no stranger to terrorist or insurgent tactics. The region has seen its fair share of rebellion, occupation and guerilla warfare-in fact some of the world’s worst. However in today’s rapidly shrinking world small elements have the ability to maximize their influence through strategic actions. These actions are then amplified by the ability to project the terrorist message to their target audience utilizing global media as the conduit. Media is used to recruit, communicate and advertise the mission of AQIM.

The entrance of AQIM, al-Qaeda's “North African franchise”, formally declared by Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al Qaeda “Prime’s”[ii] second in command in 2006, has been sure to make its debut known through a successful campaign of operations ranging from skirmishes with security forces to kidnappings and of course Al Qaeda’s favorite: The Suicide Bomber.  Since AQIM’s debut they have not slowed with activity of kinetic operations. “The Moroccan element of AQIM attempted to carry out attacks in March and April” of 2008. They have also been sure to keep their media presence up to par with their combat operations. AQIM was the most prolific and deadly group in 2007 outside of the active war zones of Iraq and Afghanistan. With Al Qaeda in Iraq facing serious problems, AQIM is in many ways carrying the torch for the jihadist movement. In fact, the only group we saw with the expertise and ordnance to hit hard targets outside of Iraq and Afghanistan in 2007 was AQIM. [iii]

In 1992 the fighters who were off battling the Soviets in Afghanistan returned to Algeria “and organized in the Armed Islamic Group, claimed more than 150,000 lives” during their resistance struggle against the Algerian government at the time. “The group has its origins in the campaign of violence that almost tore the country apart in the early 1990s when the military pre-empted elections that an Islamist coalition was poised to win.”  However the leader at the time “in 1998, Hassan Hattab and others broke away” due to the excessive force and violence.

In March 2003 the GSPC leader Amari Saifi kidnapped more than 30 European tourists, claiming the group an estimated $10 million in ransom payments. The following year, after a long, multinational hunt led by the U.S. military, he was captured in Chad and eventually turned over to the Algerians. To get help in freeing him, GSPC leader Abdelmalek Droukdal told The New York Times last month, in his first ever statement to the Western media, the group reached out in 2004 to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaida in Iraq.

Al Qaeda took the international stage as the lead actor in terrorism on September 11th 2001, drawing out many supporters and global-regional-local terror actors who wanted to align themselves with such an international presence. This led the GSPC and Al Qaeda in Iraq and Afghanistan to engage in communication via secret messages passed back and forth discussing the possibility of a merger between the two Islamic resistance groups. After Ayman al Zawahiri announced the merger in September of 2006 between the GSPC and Al Qaeda, “the GSPC formally changed its name to AQIM.”[iv]

AQIM is an Algeria-based Sunni Muslim jihadist group that originally formed in 1998 as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), a faction of the Armed Islamic Group, which was the largest and most active terrorist group in Algeria. The GSPC was renamed in January 2007 after the group officially joined Al Qaeda in September 2006. The GSPC had close to 30,000 members at its height but the Algerian Government’s counterterrorism efforts have reduced the group’s ranks to fewer than 1,000.

AQIM mainly employs conventional terrorist tactics, including guerrilla-style ambushes and mortar, rocket, and IED attacks. The group added the use of suicide bombings in April 2007, with attacks against government ministry and police buildings in Algiers that killed more than 30 people. AQIM leadership announced in May 2007 that suicide bombings will become the group’s main tactic. The group claimed responsibility for a suicide truck bomb attack that killed at least eight soldiers and injured more than 20 at a military barracks in Algeria on 11 July, the opening day of the All-Africa Games. AQIM operates primarily in northern coastal areas of Algeria and in parts of the desert regions of southern Algeria and northern Mali. Its principal sources of funding include extortion, kidnapping, donations, and narcotics trafficking.[v]
GSPC/AQIM has been able to pull off numerous successful attacks over the years since September 11th 2001 despite global counterterrorism efforts. Some major attacks have included the following:

• September 8, 2007: Car bombing near Algerian coast guard officers. 28 dead, 30 injured.
• September 6, 2007: Suicide bombing assassination attempt of Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. 22 dead, 107 injured.
• April 11, 2007: Bombing of two buildings. 33 dead and over 200 injured.
• February 13, 2007: Simultaneous car bombings of seven targets. 6 dead, 13 injured.
• December 10, 2006: Bombing of a bus carrying employees of a company linked to the U.S. construction company Haliburton. 1 dead, 9 injured (including four Britons and an American).
• April 8, 2005: Ambushed five cars at a phony roadblock. 14 dead, 1 injured.
• February 12, 2004: Ambush of Algerian paramilitary officers. 7 killed, 3 injured.
• February 2003: 32 European tourists are kidnapped. 1 dead, 17 hostages rescued by Algerian troops on May 13, 2003, and 14 released in August 2003.
• November 23, 2002: Ambush of a group of Algerian soldiers. 9 dead, 12 wounded.

There have been a number of different leaders as the organization faces an internal conflict between members as to whether or not merging with an international terrorist organization wanted by nearly every national government in the world is really conducive to the original GSPC’s goals of a national Islamic state. Some of the members are or have included the following:

• Founder: Mokhtar Belmokhtar (in Algeria)
• Founder and former leader: Hassan Hattab (GSPC)
• Founder and former leader: Abdelmalek Droudkel, a.k.a. Abu Mussab Abdelouadoud (AQIM)
• Former Leader: Sofiane El-Fassila (in Algiers)
• Current Leader: In transition, but according to some observers Ahmed Haroun is the new leader [vi]

Initially AQIM was just an Algerian threat. However as they switched to an Al Qaeda affiliate and began being forced out of Algeria they crossed borders into neighboring countries. “AQIM is [now] active in Tunisia often using it as a command center for operations in other parts of North Africa such as Algeria and to a lesser extent Morocco and Mauritania”. In February 2008, the group claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of two Austrian tourists who disappeared in southern Tunisia late that month. In the message released by AQIM claiming responsibility they “warned of further operations against Western tourists. The statement released by AQIM [also] linked the kidnapping to Israeli military operations in Gaza”.[vii]

To combat AQIM in Northern Africa the United States began implementing various joint operations and assistance to local authorities. In late 2002, the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), an effort to provide border security and other counterterrorism assistance to North African nations using U.S. Army Special Forces personnel was launched. Later the US decided to enhance efforts following the increased terrorist activity in North Africa. The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI) which began in 2005 with support from the Department of Defense's Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara (OEF-TS) has assisted greatly in mitigating the kinetic operations of AQIM.

AQIM’s focus of operations is primarily in Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Chad, Senegal, and Nigeria. They have recently been attempting to spread their activity, and even have absorbed Libyan rebels into their affiliation. As a franchise of Al Qaeda they subscribe to the ideology of militant Islamic fundamentalism with the goal of “establishing a theocracy in Algeria, the Middle East, and ultimately worldwide. Also seeks to expel Westerners from historically Muslim lands.” Their kinetic methods include bombings, kidnappings, and paramilitary operations against military and civilian targets. Beyond the obvious financial, logistical and supervisory guidance from Al Qaeda, “the Algerian government has accused Iran and Sudan of funding the group. In addition, AQIM has many members abroad, the majority located in Western Europe, who provide financial and logistical support.”[viii]

There are an estimated 400 to 800 AQIM members in Algeria led by Abdel Malek Droudkel aka Abdelwadoud Droukdel, aka Abu Mussab, GSPC's leader (an ex-Afghan, specialized in explosives). Abu Mussab has been rather active in media operation of AQIM.  The following is a direct report form the Middle East Times about him:

“Responding to the public outcry and the dissidence among his own troops, Droukdel has been active on the media front: communiqués, video clips and audio recordings. First, in a 23-page statement released at the beginning of June 2007, signed by one of GSPC's ulema (religious authority), Abu Al Hassan Rachid, stated that the 4/11 suicide bombings are "licit and based on examples taking place at the time of Ibn Taymiya. Using suicide bombers is indeed justified, as also the fact of picking sites full of civilians in order to strike the apostates." He added that "civilians who die in terror attacks against apostates will go to heaven" and that to avoid being killed, civilians are advised to avoid going to sites near public buildings. In another communiqué, signed by Droukdel, he gave a contradictory explanation. He said that using suicide bombings was in fact due to a lack of human and material resources: Indeed, suicide attacks require less human resources and little logistics than the ambushes against security services.”[ix]

A risk management company named Startegic Forcasting Inc. in August 2008 published a paper about AQIM and reviewed their media tactics. Their writings have elucidated how active AQIM has been in the global stage of terrorist media tactics. StratFor wrote:

“Abu Musab Abd al-Wadoud, head of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), issued a call to arms Aug. 12 in response to the coup in Mauritania on Aug. 6. Although AQIM has shown a presence in Mauritania, and recent attacks there have killed police officers and foreign tourists, AQIM has thus far not shown an ability to seriously threaten Mauritania. Al-Wadoud is using the coup in Mauritania as an opportunity to recruit members and build AQIM’s support base, but the group will continue focusing its energy in Algeria.  […] he urged Mauritanians to “wake up and prepare for the war; the cross is ymarching toward you.”[x]

Media operations though becoming more and more cost efficient still require a relative higher income to fund the generally expensive devices to produce such media. “AQIM has a tradition of self-financing its operations mostly through kidnappings, racketeering and smuggling of all kinds.”[xi] With such a decent income AQIM have been able to acquire more advanced equipment and technologies and have “increased use of high-tech equipment”.[xii] Increased income and low cost technologies have made it possible and feasible for AQIM to produce a greater quality and quantity of media products to disseminate into the global media matrix.

Media Operations require a lot of symbology to be used in order to tap into the subconscious and conscious realms of their audience. To begin with AQIM’s logo is a globe set against a black background with an AK-47 Kalashnikov rifle and a black flag arising from the globe. Gray lettering below the globe reads, “In the name of God, Most Gracious, Most Merciful.” The yellow lettering at the bottom states the name of the group, “Al Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb.” The Anti-Defamation League has explained the logo as follows: “A black background (in flags and symbols) often represents death, militancy and the goal of restoring the Islamic caliphate – a united Muslim empire. The globe evokes the organization’s worldwide ambitions. The flag and rifle symbolize militancy. The declaration of faith, which is the first verse of every chapter in the Quran (but one) and is recited several times in daily prayer, denotes the centrality of Islam for the group.” [xiii]

In early March 2008 the Saudi daily Asharq al-Awsat published a letter from AQIM entitled, "Call for help from the Islamic Maghreb." Within the letter “AQIM acknowledged that it is suffering from a lack of operatives and most importantly that its elements have "an urgent need of cash." Iraq’s franchise of AL Qaeda has set the standard modus operandi for seemingly all Al Qaeda regional franchises. AQIM has employed suicide bombings (which were not previously present, especially during the GSPC’s reign of rebellion). AQIM moved onto recruiting teenagers to do their works (particularly the suicide bombing part) and have since begun abducting foreign nationals. “The example of the Austrian hostages might just be the start of a kidnapping wave.”[xiv] So in traditional Islamic extremist nature AQIM publicizes its operations in hopes for continued support from the Islamic community via fiscal, moral, logistical and recruitment support, or otherwise.

“AQIM wants to turn the Maghreb into a new Iraq and that is why it is using suicide terror attacks rather than a classical guerilla war that it is indeed losing (suicide bombings happen also to be less costly to the organization than a guerilla war).” AQIM understands from previous experience in Algeria and of course Iraq that an insurgency often does not work in the sense of low level conflict, however brutal strategic and precise terrorism often does. If it does not, they know at least they will live on in the media and perhaps others will take up the cause down the road. [xv]

With effect of media operations it is important to note the symbolical aspects of these most recent attacks. “First, Dec. 11, 1960 is a crucial date in Algeria's history of independence from France. The constitutional court happens to be located on the December 11 Boulevard.” Also more importantly so the “11th factor” is a known Al Qaeda favorite, a “hallmark” if you will.  “Not only for 9/11 in the United States, but also for 3/11 in Madrid and AQIM's suicide attacks on 3/11 in Casablanca, 4/11 in Algiers, 7/11 in Lakhdaria in Algeria and now 12/11.” AQIM has managed to add to the “11”. AQIM has succeeded in creating an "11" fixation; “some in Algeria even describe the 11th as "the date of the devil."”[xvi]

One former Pentagon intelligence officer stated “AQIM mass media campaign has been largely successful since 2003 in recruiting lower income individuals and convincing them to go to Iraq to be fighters for the Jihad.  Generally the media campaigns do not mention martyrdom specifically and very few agree initially to be suicide bombers.  Upon arrival to Iraq many are then coerced into suicide missions from there, when they do not have the option of going home without an AQ network willing to facilitate their travel out of Iraq without having of first made some contribution.”[xvii]

With one primary target of AQIM’s media campaign being the youth of North Africa for the purposes of recruitment, and such a vast amount of foreign fighters going to Iraq and Afghanistan to fight in the conflicts it is apparent to see the success of their media strategy targeting the right potential future recruits. AQIM “has been on a very active recruiting campaign. It is using the al-Qaida brand to attract the youth who think they are going to fight in Iraq but are then used for domestic operations, including suicide bombings.”[xviii]

The Nine Eleven Finding Answers (NEFA) Organization has acquired a number of training camp videos from AQIM. These videos can be analyzed indepth about their purpose and value to AQIM. The general theme is recurrent propaganda messages such as training scenes with a still photo of Osama Bin Laden in the back ground and the video is over laid with audio of his professing. Also, Zawahiri is apparently show via a still image with words in Arabic flashed across the screen and audio in the background playing of speeches or Arabic music.

In the training video there are many training tactics being shown. Tactics included in training are similar to tactics that the US military use, specifically in the Special Operations community and other specialized operations such as urban combat and ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance). Also included are small unit tactics such as combat rolls, running, ducking, reaction drills, bounding techniques, react to contact, land navigation, ambush and raid operations, patrolling tactics, attack and withdrawal procedures, CQB (Close Quarters Combat) skills and hand to Hand combat training,

There are a lot of physical agility testing, such as climbing, crossing “monkey bar” sets, running in place, marching, jogging, and other highly physical related movements. The idea here is to show how strong the terrorists are. This is meant to strike fear into their opponents and to create a tough look that younger potential recruits would want to be part of in order to make them feel like grown men. The same tactics are used in US Military recruiting videos.

Other training tactics are taught such as disarming opponents, capture and search of EPWs (Enemy Prisoners of War or detainees), weapons maintenance, weapons loading and arming, general weapons training of specific weapons such as automatic weapons, hand guns, and rifles. Again, it is apparent that the target audience for these videos are potential future recruits; the videos being used to motivate the recruits and brag about the quality of training. The second target audience of the footage are the Western powers and their allies. The logic is to show how AQIM is a potent and professional force to be feared.

One video released by AQIM shows the suicide bomber before he dies talking to the cameraman explaining how he is going to martyr himself. It seems obvious that the boy who is a young 15 years of age is being manipulated by elder terrorists. The technology used for the video is diverse, with the bulk of the actual video footage coming from a digital video camera yet the final moments of the boys life coming from a cellular phone’s video recording function.

The imagery used and concept behind the filmography is apparent by the multiple replays of the explosion made by the truck bomb that the 15 year old detonated while killing himself. The replaying of key images are done to burn into the memory of the audience so they do not forget the power that AQIM intends to project they have. Also for those who support the mission of AQIM the replaying of the imagery serves as a way of arousing and evoking the emotions of potential and current AQIM terrorists. They producers are also sure to tap into religio-cultural consciousness of the audience by playing Arabic music in the background of the video.

There are multiple angles of filming which come from multiple distances. This serves as a full-spectrum representation of the event. The replaying of differing angles and differing distances in turn creates the event into nearly a pseudo event by taking one instance and manipulating it into a multi media-multi perceived media event.

AQIM is not shy about recording their activities on video for the sake of publication. In a CBS News Investigates report AQIM was reported as filming a false road block they had set up in Algeria in order to purge opposition that came through. On November 14th a 13 minute and twenty two second long video showing the false road block recently set up in the Tizi Ouzou province, in northern Algeria.

CBS News wrote the following about the most recent false road block video release:

“The video opened with shots showing the operatives getting ready for the operation; shaving their beards and preparing their military uniforms. Once ready, the men set up a roadblock on a forested road leading to Tizi Ouzou. They began stopping cars, checking drivers' licenses and IDs in search of any police or army personnel. After a few hours, they finally found their prey; an Algerian police officer dressed in civilian clothes who was travelling in one of the vehicles. They then lead the man to the side of the road, and make him lie on the ground with his hands behind his back. He desperately tries to tell them that he is “one of them,” but soon realized that they were not exactly who he thought they were. He therefore tried to run off into the bushes, but they immediately shot him down, before the eyes of dozens of passengers sitting in their cars along the road. Very calmly, the men unveiled their true identity to the shocked crowd, distributing statements and propaganda CDs.”[xix]

AQIM has taken some hits from the counter terror efforts in the region. Since April nine top AQIM leaders (mostly elements close to Droudkel) were either killed or arrested, including his second in command, the treasurer and the main communications operative. With the Communications specialist out of the picture it is sure that there will be a dip in the media operations of AQIM but technology is the static, not the operator. It doesn’t take much for someone to purchase a camera cell phone and record attacks or militant sermons.

Another method of indoctrination which can be viewed as media at times is the educational system that AQIM has been influencing if not running completely in certain areas of North Africa. “Al Qaeda figured out long ago that the way to change a nation/people is through their education, what better way to influence people than through their educational system.” Madrassas are appearing all over Northern Africa, one US Military Intelligence officer stated they are “springing up left and right […] many in areas that were once peaceful.” Madrassas themselves are not a threat, however these ones’ key foci seem to be militant Islam and disdain for the West, particularly America and its former European colonial powers.  This is done in the vacuum of official government schooling programs and infrastructure. The Intelligence officer felt that Al Qaeda” has seen how easy it is to open a school and tell all the surrounding community that they can send their children to school for a better future.  A future of what is the problem.”[xx]

The prospect of AQIM is grim in the near term yet relatively positive in the far term. The situation will get worse before it gets better and at the cost of many lives and vast amounts of financial resources. With Al Qaeda going global at a rapid rate we are seeing a joint mission amongst Islamic extremist groups all signing up to get on board. “Evidence suggests that AQIM is now in active communication with al-Qaida's network in other parts of the world. Citing intercepts by U.S. and European intelligence agencies, "they appear to be in contact with al-Qaida in Somalia and Chechnya," said Peter von Sivers, an expert on post-colonial Algeria and professor of North African history at the University of Utah.”[xxi]

As AQIM reaches out to touch base with other Al Qaeda elements around the globe we will begin to see how media tactics become a standard norm. Iraq being the primary model to copy (we saw this in Afghanistan). Terrorist groups are evolutionary and mimicking. They adapt to counter terror measures well, and can go from high tech to low tech in the blink of an eye. As technology gets pushed downwards to more cost efficient and more portable and compatible devices we are sure to see media operations increase drastically. As of now AQIM itself, doesn’t seem to have a huge internet presence aside from videos released to the web usually via third party candidates.

With America’s newest counter terror effort in Africa, the recently stood up US Army’s Africa Command, or AFRICOM, will be facing AQIM on an unprecedented level, “the war against AQIM is being led from the new headquarters of the U.S. Army's Africa Command.”[xxii] This command will be taking a front seat in the fight against AQIM especially as the Iraqi and Afghani theaters of operation become tamer and the African theater become more engaged and in flux. “The increasing presence of al-Qaida is making it all the more important for the United States to be present in one fashion or another in the region.”[xxiii]
Multilateral counter terror efforts in Africa will become more visible and active as they have already become, seen especially with the piracy off the Somali coast. As more nations become threatened by Africa’s instability they will realize that Africa needs to be engaged. With the engagement of Africa AQIM is surely to see a struggle ahead of itself requiring a much broader media campaign for recruitment and fundraising. As this theater of terror becomes more globalized we will see more influence on terrorist groups by other groups.

In late November 2008 in Mumbai, India “in simultaneous attacks, Islamist terrorists killed at least 195 people and injured another 300 during a 60-hour killing spree. The tactics used by the terrorists were different from the classical jihadist playbook. Does it mean that Mumbai-style attacks are the new jihadist modus operandi?”[xxiv] There is becoming an increasing worry by governments around the globe that the recent attacks in Mumbai will set the standard for future terrorist operations. The Mumbai attacks set a precedence, placing the entire nation of India under house arrest held hostage. Much of the world felt as if they had been taken hostage too. This new style of elongated terror campaign is being seen much more (read: Chechnya Theater operation). AQIM is a new upshot of a group (albeit evolved form an older experienced and seasoned cadre) and they have a quick learning curve for adopting new tactics. It is just a matter of time before AQIM sees how successful the Mumbai attacks were and they emulate them.

One Intelligence Operator in the US Department of Defense stated “I am confident we will see a Mumbai style attack in the Maghreb within twelve months. It will have to be one of international interest with foreign nationals, and in North Africa but not in Algeria because the security is too tight. I am thinking Casablanca.” He stated “the Mumbai attacks were less a kinetic operation and more of a media operation” as the purpose of them were to hold a nation and the world hostage while instilling fear into them and bringing global interest in the Islamic issues in the India-Pakistani theater.[xxv]

This new modus operandi is reminiscent of the Chechnya attack and subsequent hostage taking of theater. Old school simple attacks are just not salacious enough to elicit maximum coverage from news agencies around the world. “One of the main reasons for the terrorists switching tactics was to grab the world's attention. The new modus operandi was to attack soft targets, including major landmarks and also kill foreign nationals. While some al-Qaida affiliates - in particular al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb - have recently switched to focusing on soft targets because the hard targets are becoming so well protected, the tactics used in Mumbai are new.”[xxvi] “What is most worrisome about this new modus operandi is that 10 terrorists were able to inflict so much damage, kill so many people and hold hostage an 18-million-people megalopolis for 60 hours. Imagine how much more horrible it could have been if they were 50, 100 or 500. The fact that the operation was so successful from the terrorists' point of view could give ideas to others to do the same in Europe, Africa or even the United States.”[xxvii]

With the globalization of terrorism and AQIM attempting successfully to mimic the Iraq contingent of Al Qaeda, there is bound to be grave similarities to the Al Qaeda elements in Iraq which is a deadly prediction. AQIM has been gaining valuable experience in Iraq as visiting foreign fighters learning AQI (Al Qaeda in Iraq) tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). “Evan Kohlmann, a terrorism consultant, estimates that North Africans represent between 9 percent and 25 percent of foreign fighters in Iraq”.[xxviii] The future will see more Iraqi style tactics as we have already seen with IEDs. These TTPs include media operations. ISI (Islamic State of Iraq) an umbrella organization of Islamic insurgent and terrorist groups operating in Iraq which included AQI has been renown with their uncanny ability to produce highly influential media products. [xxix] AQIM is adopting similar media TTPs in order to recruit, inform and advertise their mission and goals.
​
The successes of AQIM is notable in the context of global terrorist threats when we observe the fact that they have been the most active with successful attacks of all Al Qaeda in the world outside of Iraq and Afghanistan theaters of operations. “The Egyptian node has not carried out a successful attack since announcing its allegiance to al Qaeda in August 2006. Jemaah Islamiyah, al Qaeda’s Indonesian franchise, has not conducted a successful attack since the October 2005 Bali bombing, and the Sinai node, Tawhid wa al-Jihad, did not conduct any attacks in 2007. Its last attack was in April 2006.” [xxx] With kinetic operations come media operations and as successful kinetic operations increase so do successful media operations. We will surely see an increase in AQIM media operations.
 
Works Cited
[i] The Al-Qaida We Don't Know: AQIM, the North African Franchise Joseph Kirschke 26 Oct 2008 World Politics Review
[ii] Strategic Forecasting, Inc. www.Stratfor.Com
[iii] Strategic Forecasting, Inc. www.Stratfor.Com
[iv] Analysis: Algeria bombs show al-Q strength. By Shaun Waterman (UPI Homeland and National Security Editor. Published: August 22, 2008
[v] National Counter Terror Center http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/aqim.html
[vi] Anti-Defamation League http://www.adl.org/terrorism/symbols/al_qaeda_maghreb.asp
[vii] Former Pentagon North African Intelligence Officer. Interview on conditions of anonymity. 28 April 2008.
[viii] Anti-Defamation League http://www.adl.org/terrorism/symbols/al_qaeda_maghreb.asp
[ix] Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb's dilemma By Olivier Guitta Middle East Times Published: January 28, 2008
[x] Strategic Forecasting Inc. www.stratfor.Com Mauritania: The Unlikelihood of al Qaeda's Threat August 13, 2008)
[xi] “AQIM's new kidnapping strategy” By Olivier Guitta. Middle East Times Published: March 24, 2008
[xii] “GSPC Dossier” Center For Policing Terrorism June 1, 2005
[xiii] Anti-Defamation League http://www.adl.org/terrorism/symbols/al_qaeda_maghreb.asp
[xiv] AQIM's new kidnapping strategy By Olivier Guitta (Middle East Times) Published: March 24, 2008
[xv] Anthony N. Celso. “Al Qaeda in the Maghreb: The ‘Newest’ Front in the War on Terror.” Mediterranean Quarterly, winter 2008; 19: 80 - 96.
[xvi] The Maghreb: Al-Qaida's new major front? By Olivier Guitta (Middle East Times) Published: December 24, 2007
[xvii]Department of Defense Official, Former North African Counter Terrorism Specialist. Interview December 2008. Under Conditions of Anonymity.
[xviii] The Maghreb: Al-Qaida's new major front? By Olivier Guitta (Middle East Times) Published: December 24, 2007
[xix] New Video Shows AQIM Attack Using False Roadblock. November 14, 2008, 1:16 PM CBS News Investigates.
[xx] Interview, Military Intelligence Officer. Under Conditions of anonymity. December 3, 2008.
[xxi] “The Al-Qaida We Don't Know: AQIM, the North African Franchise” Joseph Kirschke | 26 Oct 2008 World Politics Review http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=2819
[xxii] “Al-Qaeda Sahara Network Spurs U.S. to Train Chad, Mali Forces” By Daniel Williams April 23. Bloomberg.
[xxiii] Africa: The Next Stage of the War. By OLIVIER GUITTA (Middle East Times) Published: June 02, 2008.
[xxiv] Mumbai: Islamist Terror's New Modus Operandi By OLIVIER GUITTA (Middle East Times) Published: December 01, 2008
[xxv] Interview. US Intelligence Operator, Department of Defense. December 5, 2008. Under Conditions of Anonymity.
[xxvi] “Mumbai: Islamist Terror's New Modus Operandi.” Olivier Guitta. Middle East Times. Published: December 01, 2008.
[xxvii] Mumbai: Islamist Terror's New Modus Operandi By Olivier Guitta Middle East Times Published: December 01, 2008
[xxviii]  Council on Foreign Relations.  http://www.cfr.org/publication/12717/alqaeda_in_the_islamic_maghreb_aqim_or_lorganisation_alqada_au_maghreb_islamique_formerly_salafist_group_for_preaching_and_combat_or_groupe_salafiste_pour_la_prdication_et_le_combat.html?breadcrumb=%2Fissue%2F456%2Fterrorist_organizations
[xxix] "Islamic State of Iraq." Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. 15 Oct 2008, 12:49 UTC. 8 Dec 2008 <http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Islamic_State_of_Iraq&oldid=245432666>.
[xxx] Al Qaeda in 2008: The Struggle for Relevance December 19, 2007. www.StratFor.Com. Strategic Forecasting Inc.

US policy towards Africa is controversial and varied. North Africa has its own focus for US interests which are significantly different than sub-Saharan Africa. Tunisia being in the dead center of the North African coast puts it right in the middle of US foreign policy. “Virtually all discussions of U.S. interests in North Africa start with the region's strategic location. Perhaps the only time that U.S.-North African relations were near the top of U.S. foreign-policy concerns goes back to the early 1800s and the so-called ‘Barbary Wars.’” Later in the 20th century US policy changed course a bit. As colonial Africa fell apart into bloody independence movements the global super powers began to reach their hands in to pick up and salvage what it could for the sake of security and economic incentives. “Throughout the Cold War, U.S. relations with North Africa were defined by America's broader struggle with the Soviet Union” (Hemmer).

US foreign policy goals in Tunisia are diverse. The State Department’s Strategic Mission Plan lists the goals of US interests. I have selected the top four goals to discuss as the other five are more general such as “Mutual Understanding” or more specific such as setting up a language school. The top four goals are stated as the following: 1) Democratic Reform and Respect for Universal Human Rights Standards 2) Stronger Counterterrorism Coordination and Cooperation 3) Regional Stability and Support for U.S. Middle East Policy 4) Open and Growing Economy (Plan).

The first goal for Democratic reform and human rights is handled primarily by the State Department. Utilizing dialogue and diplomacy the State Department is attempting to mitigate human rights abuses and coordinate democratic institutionalization. The second goal is for counterterrorism coordination and is initiated by State Department however implemented by Department of Defense and the US Intelligence community. The third goal for regional stability and support is a collaborate effort of US agencies. The fourth goal for an open and growing economy is employed via economic free trade agreements and aid packages.

“While some have argued that the terrorist attacks of 9/11 "fundamentally altered U.S. attitudes and policy toward the region," there is a good case to be made for arguing that there has been continuity in U.S. policy toward North Africa, with the war on terror simply replacing the Cold War, a transition that was underway well before the attacks on New York and Washington. For example, even as early as 1994, the United States was worried about the rise of politicized Islam in North Africa, insisting that Islam "is not our enemy" but that "U.S. policy is firmly opposed to fanaticism and extremism." During a Congressional delegation visit to Tunisia in 2005, Senator Russ Feingold remarked that, though his last visit to Tunis was over a decade before, the issues in U.S.-Tunisian relations had not changed: "We talked about three things 11 years ago, and we talked about those same three things again: terrorism, human rights and democracy" (Hemmer).

In 1987 President Zine Al Abidine Ben Ali came to power and since then changes have been occurring at a steady pace giving way to quality of life increases and an increased yearning for education and modernity in the country. The national push for Democratic reforms and structure is seen easily in the elections that occur regularly. There were Democratic Municipal elections in 2000 and again in 2005. There is a push for observers to be employed to oversee the electoral process in hopes to bring a transparent practice. Though the evolution from colonial subjugate to a democratic free state has been long and often tedious it is actualizing and as one local national stated “it will take time” (Lancaster). A useful benchmark for Democratic reform in a country, particularly a developing Islamic state is that of the condition of liberties and equality afforded to its female population.

Unlike other male dominated nation states in the middle-east and African regions Tunisia has afforded women with many more liberties. One female city voter in the 2005 municipal elections expressing her desire to vote stated "this is our opportunity to participate in the democratic process of our country. We must be involved, it is our right but also our duty". Women play a prominent role, not only in politics but “women play an active role in all sectors of Tunisian society as they constitute 27% of judges, 31% of lawyers, 40% of higher education teachers and 34% of journalists (Lancaster). Often in developing nations education is the key component in bridging the gender gap and Tunisia is no exception to this paradigm.
Since independence literacy has risen from 20% to almost 100% in the under 12 age group. Free press has increased however the largest obstacle seems to be self censorship, perhaps a national conscious fear of speaking out exists. The government is working to afford personal computers with internet access to citizen and there is seemingly no overarching censorship in any official capacity. One journalist was quoted as saying “Self censorship is the real enemy of a free press in Tunisia. But is important to remind ourselves that, in time, this will change. Tunisia has changed drastically over the last 18 years and the coming decade will be even more telling" (Lancaster).

US Foreign Policy spearheaded by the US State Department shows us the key foci for US policy concerns. The State Department’s general interest is to mitigate human rights abuses in Tunisia. As an ally of the United States it never looks good when the world’s leading human rights proponent is in bed with human rights abusers. Often Tunisia does not want to delve into this issue and avoids it. Despite economic advances and security assurances this is handled by an often oppressive government that partakes in such abuses. The State Department is often forced into subtle requests for human rights advances via economic and free trade discourse (State).

This is done in a way that one could consider it a slight of hand approach; however it is the only way it can be done when dealing with a nation that often is accused of being a dictatorship. Realistically that is what diplomacy is. The US wants stability and Tunisia wants money. The State Department has had to “broaden dialogue to incorporate economic issues” to assist with human rights. Other topics of discourse are weaved into the discourse of human rights. Business transparency is part of a democratic free market state and has relevance to human rights transparency. The State Department also is able to “connect technical topics to human rights and transparency” (State).

Tunisia, “a country that is far ahead in education, literacy, women’s rights and economic development, while remaining a decided laggard in democratic reform and human rights” (Plan). A view from inside the country perhaps supports a more grim perspective. One former citizen expressed disdain for the political system. He said that President Ben Ali has been in power for 17 years and his “dictatorship” is littered with “corruption” and finally remarked “and they call it a Democracy?!” Despite other sources that state there is a free press where personal censorship is the only censorship the former resident asserted that the Ben Ali government will detain individuals that speak out (Taher).

The former citizen did however give accolades to Women’s rights in Tunisia. Apparently women can dress as they see fit, which is in contrast to many other states with predominant Islamic majorities. Women live freely; have the right to divorce and the right to vote. One must presume the liberties afforded to women come from the European trends. It is important to note that Tunisia is Sunni dominated with very little Shia presence and those who are Shia do not vocalize or make it known of their particular religious affiliation. The liberties afforded in Tunisia under a Sunni dominated society sets an interesting example as most Sunni run states are much more conservative (Taher).

The political spectrum in North Africa has fluctuated greatly in specifics yet not in scope. North African nations have always been trying to seek independence yet assistance from larger nations. The evolution of Tunisia and the rest of North Africa most dramatically changed three times in the last 100 years. The first serious change was the move for independence following the breakdown of European colonial subjugation. “The collapse of over half a century of European hegemony on the continent occurred just as the Soviet Union under Nikita Khrushchev’s energetic leadership was searching for opportunities to expand its influence in the Third World” (Clough). During the Cold War the Soviets were trying to get their red hands into the African cookie jar, US policy was mainly to keep states from going ‘Commie’ as we feared the infamous Domino Effect. The Soviets however managed to a great degree to ascertain significant influence on the continent.

The second major change in politics in Africa and Tunisia specifically was when the Soviet Empire fell in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. This of course left a power/influence vacuum in the region. Immediately the US was focusing the first couple years of the decade on the Middle East in regards to the Gulf War. Later the US attempted to engage the Dark Continent in the 1990’s yet was dissuaded following the ‘Black Hawk Down’ incident in Somalia in 1994. After that was projected all around the world via global media the US was left feeling scarred and scared of Africa.

The United States in the 1990’s was withdrawing its focus abroad following 50 plus years of near insanity. The decade would remind America that they are not alone in this world. First in 1993 there was the World Trade Center bombing then in 1996 the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia, then bringing Africa into focus there were the attacks in 1998 on US Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. These attacks put Africa back on the map (Wikipedia).

The third significant shift in African relations occurred come the 2000 attack on the USS Cole in Yemen and September 11th 2001 attacks, the US had now realized on a macro level that it was involved in a low intensity conflict with extremist elements of Islamic faith. This shifted US focus to Africa and the Middle East. Once Afghanistan and Iraq came into the picture North Africa became very much in the limelight of US foreign policy.

A lot can be said for how far Tunisia has come since its independence 50 years ago and also how far US policies towards Tunisia have come. “As the states of North Africa were seeking independence, moderation meant accepting that the decolonization process was going to be slow and that, in the meantime, violence, especially violence that risked creating a rift between the United States and France with regard to the developing North Atlantic Treaty Organization, had to be avoided. Thus, while the United States was nominally in favor of self-determination, it offered little tangible assistance to North African independence movements” (Hemmer).

“As the Cold War worsened, moderation meant taking America's side against the Soviets. Tunisia, like Morocco, has had close political ties with the United States, but its small size and its republican, but still authoritarian, political system presented distinctive political challenges. In essence, the United States is attempting to slide Algeria and Libya into the policy framework already in existence with regard to American relations with Tunisia” leaving Tunisia as a forerunner in North African-US relations. “By maintaining close relations with Tunisia and [and other North African states], the United States has moved beyond dividing the states of North Africa into those that are with us or against us” (Hemmer).

US Policy makers realize Tunisia’s importance in the world. Tunisia is in a “strategic” location. Situated inside the Mediterranean Basin and falling between Africa, Europe and the Middle East. Maintaining “a stable, prosperous, and democratic” state which “respects human rights can be an important force for peace and development” throughout North Africa and the Middle East which is a US goal at large. Tunisia supports many US initiatives in the region either by taking part in them, such as counter terror efforts in the Sahel, or by vocalizing support. One interesting item that Tunisia has defended despite its Arab neighbor’s opposition is the United States operations in Iraq (Plan).

“Tunisia has been supportive of the democratic process in Iraq and of the new government”. Tunisia has also admitted to the presence of Tunisians who have participated in the insurgency in Iraq and has addressed the issue “seriously”. The very sensitive issue of the Israeli-Palestine situation is also addressed by Tunisia. Tunisia promotes “non-violence and moderation”. The US continues to “encourage” Tunisia to take a lead stance with handling Israel with normal relations. The State Department also is in hopes that having the former Tunisian foreign minister positioned in the Arab Maghreb Union as the Secretary General “will raise [the country’s] profile as a potential facilitator of regional integration” (Plan).

It is the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) which is the “central program” in America’s efforts to promote bilateral democracy in North Africa. The MEPI’s goals are defined as "supporting democracy promotion, economic reform, quality education and women's empowerment in the Middle East." For instance, MEPI provided money for the training of political-party staff and bankers in Morocco, parliamentarians in Morocco and Algeria, and journalists in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia” (Hemmer). Though Tunisia remains an autocratic regime under Democratic cover, it is one where “starvation, homelessness, and disease, problems” visible in most other developing countries in Africa and Asia is seldom (Wikipedia 1).

Stimulating the economies and bringing greater market value to the Tunisia economy is of great importance to US policy. Its tactic for this is to ensure “the Tunisian economy is open and integrated into the world economy” (Plan). “Beyond the fact that Tunisia [has a] small economy in relation to the United States, [Tunisia does] the bulk of [its] trading with the states of the European Union rather than the United States”.  This is the same situation in most of the North African states especially Morocco. “The situation with Tunisia is almost identical, with Europe being the destination of over 80 percent of Tunisia's exports and the source of 75 percent of its imports” (Hemmer). France is the number one trading partner with Tunisia. This is of no surprise considering Frances colonial role in the region in the past (Taher).

It is in America’s interest to develop better economic ties with Tunisia. Through the US Trade Representative Authority in order “to increase trade with its longstanding allies in North Africa, the United States signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement [TIFA] with Tunisia in October 2002 […] while such agreements may increase U.S. trade with both, they are unlikely to substantially alter either's overall trade patterns, especially as [Tunisia already has a] longstanding association agreement with the European Union” (Hemmer). However this is a start. There have been some setbacks though. After the TIFA agreement in 2002 “talks were stalled since 2005 until March 2008” due to difficulties convincing Tunisia of the need to better their human rights record (State).

Foreign investment and economic influence is highly European despite US efforts to attract interest to the American economic powerhouse. There is a large presence of European or European emulated shops, resorts and cafes. The Persian Gulf states have a lot of influence also. Once stability and economic prosperity reaches Tunisia there will (as there is now) be money to be made by foreign investment. The US wants a piece of the pie too and is willing to compete with European and Middle Eastern states for influence (Taher). The United States has courses of action to counter the non-US influence in the region for economic reasons.

Increasing American investment in Tunisia is of significant importance to US policy makers. The American Government has set particular objectives in order to attain their goal, and this has provided significant positive results to date. For example, the “total dollar value of American companies' direct investment increases 5 percent over annual average of 2004-2006.” And in order to be sure there is equal bilateral trade the US was successful in that the total dollar value “increase[d] 10 percent over [the] annual average of 2004-2006.”

Piracy of intellectual property is often a big problem in developing nations with grey and black market economies. The US has pushed for “improved enforcement of intellectual property rights in the retail sector.” Though the TIFA has been signed for years, there are still specifics to be worked out. It is for this reason that “high-level economic and commercial delegation” has driven the “TIFA process toward the clear goal of a Free Trade Agreement” (Plan).

“Full liberalization of the economy will not only increase U.S. trade and investment, but will stimulate the development of a robust private sector and promote continued economic growth and stability.” This is to be done by working “with private organizations, such as the Tunisian-American Chamber of Commerce, and U.S. corporations to promote US exports and US business interests.” Another method of engagement is to “provide technical assistance programs to facilitate implementation of market-based economic reforms” in order to attain “Economic Growth and Prosperity” (Plan). Despite the complex and often difficult approach to reforming Tunisia’s economy there are signs of success for example “Tunisia is ranked most competitive economy of Africa, first in the Arab World and 29th globally” (Wikipedia 2). Globalization lends itself to globalized issues and problems. Tunisia has seen its fair share of these previously and continues to do so currently.

The US goal of promoting economic reform in Tunisia “aims to encourage the development of laws and policies that foster private sector-driven economic growth, increase U.S. exports to and investment in Tunisia, and favor sustainable development.” The Government of Tunisia has implemented in recent years a number of reforms for their economy. However, “significant barriers to U.S. trade and investment remain” (Plan).

The United States intends to “work with private organizations, such as the Tunisian-American Chamber of Commerce, and U.S. corporations to promote US exports and US business interests.” Some US Government agencies that participate in the process are the United States Department of Agriculture, the US Department of Commerce, the US Department of Transportation and the US Treasury (Plan). With such joint ventures and diverse approaches to economic reform in Tunisia the US Government is hoping the multi-faceted approach will generate a successful outcome quicker and more comprehensively.

With the events of September 11th 2001, US foreign policy to North Africa had become refocused on counterterrorism efforts. “Today, the prism through which the United States looks at North Africa is the war on terror. One example of this increased emphasis on counterterrorism initiatives is NATO's Operation Active Endeavor. Created soon after 9/11, this ongoing maritime surveillance regime in the Mediterranean involves increased naval cooperation between NATO and Moroccan, Algerian and Tunisian forces” (Hemmer).

Tunisia is centrally located between two hot spots for Islamic extremist terrorism. With Algeria to the east still facing insurgent and terrorist violence and conservative Islamic states to the west deep in the heart of the Middle East, Tunisia is a small nation that faces significant challenges in the wake of the global war on terror. US and Europe find it critical to forge alliances with the Islamic states for the purpose of managing the extremist elements in the region.

“Africa, though more imminently Northern Africa from coast to coast is going to be the next front for the current war on terror. Al Qaeda is looking for pathways into Europe geographically and demographically. Light skinned North Africans who can speak European languages fluently and with European accents coupled with much European cultural experiences and contacts is vital to the Al Qaeda threat in Europe. The only place this can be found en mass is Northern Africa. This was apparent as far back as at least 2003; around the time of the Iraq invasion” (Operator).

Originally the focus on extremist elements with potential ties to Al Qaeda was centered in Algeria where there has been an active Islamic insurgency fighting the Algerian government and attacking foreigners. However, as the Algerian government with the assistance of US-Euro assets began to crack down upon the insurgents, things began to change. US-Euro support increased greatly once the Algerian militant group ‘The Salafist Group for Call and Combat’ (GSPC) declared its allegiance to Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda and renamed itself to AQIM or Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (ADL).

Initially AQIM was just an Algerian threat. However as they switched to an Al Qaeda affiliate and began being forced out of Algeria they crossed borders into neighboring countries. “AQIM is [now] active in Tunisia often using it as a command center for operations in other parts of North Africa such as Algeria and to a lesser extent Morocco and Mauritania” (Pentagon). On February 22nd “two Austrian tourists disappeared in southern Tunisia. The group claimed responsibility and demanded the release of one of its leaders, Abdel Rezak Al-Para, who has been jailed for life in Algeria” (Bloomberg).

In the message released by AQIM claiming responsibility they “warned of further operations against Western tourists. The statement released by AQIM [also] linked the kidnapping to Israeli military operations in Gaza” (Pentagon). AQIM is a concerning issue for US foreign policy and local authorities such as the “Tunisian police [who] believe that Al Qaeda has moved its headquarters from Algeria to Tunisia. There have been more arrests of Islamic terrorists in Tunisia lately, and the Tunisian population is not as alert to, and hostile towards, Islamic terrorists as most Algerians are” which is leaving Tunisia ripe for the fomenting of terror cells (Page).

To combat AQIM in Northern Africa the United States began implementing various joint operations and assistance to local authorities. “Progress has been slow, but steady. In late 2002, the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), a modest effort to provide border security and other counterterrorism assistance to Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger using personnel from U.S. Army Special Forces attached to the Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR), was launched.” Later the US decided to ramp up efforts following the increased terrorist activity in North Africa. The “Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI). Inaugurated in 2005 with support from the Department of Defense's Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara (OEF-TS), TSCTI added Algeria, Nigeria, Morocco, Senegal, and Tunisia to the original four PSI countries” with the intent “for a rapid reaction unit for each partner country” (Pham).

In June of 2005 a TSCTI sponsored exercise named Flintlock '05, “whose goal was to help participating nations to plan and execute command, control and communications systems in support of future combined humanitarian, peacekeeping and disaster relief operations. According to the then-deputy commander of [Special Operations Command Europe] (SOCEUR), the training was ‘to ensure all nations continue developing their partnerships,’ while further enhancing ‘their capabilities to halt the flow of illicit weapons, goods and human trafficking in the region; and prevent terrorists from establishing sanctuary in remote areas.’ The strategic effect sought by TSCTI directly addresses what the 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism called the ‘4D strategy’: defeat terrorist organizations; deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists, diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit; and defend the United States, its citizens, and its interests, not just at home but in all theatres abroad” (Pham).

Last August the exercise Flintlock ‘07, took place as a computer simulated exercise called a CPX or Command Post Exercise. “Participating along with U.S. personnel were officers from the TSCTI partner countries – Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia – as well as France, Great Britain, and the Netherlands. The primary objective of the simulations run in the CPX was to strengthen the capacity of the participants to plan and execute collaborative command, control, and communications systems in support of potential future humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, as well as counterterrorism operations” (Pham).

Countering terrorist activities is in everyone’s best interest, except for the terrorists of course. The US has put into action not only the TSCTI but also restructured the African theater into one US Military command called Africa Command or AFRICOM. Tunisia’s regional neighbors “Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger are [all] taking part in the U.S.-sponsored military programs. AFRICOM’s mission is to train their forces to roust terrorists and also to control sparsely patrolled borders for arms traffic, drug smuggling and infiltration by violent organizations” (Bloomberg).

Tunisia will no doubt be tied into these counterterrorism efforts. The United States is not the only foreign power however, to engage itself and assist with African nations’ endeavors to put a halt to terror activities. “European Union leaders are increasingly alarmed over the terrorism potential along the nation bloc's southern flank, just across the Mediterranean from Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco.” The European Union has taken particular interest as it is believed that terrorist activities in Europe are operating with North Africa as the base or at least conduit for the operations (Bloomberg).

To date, these efforts in North Africa appear successful. “In a February 2006 trip to North Africa, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld visited Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, commending each for ‘providing moderate leadership’ and being ‘constructive in the problems of the world and the struggle against violent extremism’” (Hemmer). The Tunisian government has cracked down especially hard on extremist activities making it much more difficult to operate freely. In the past extremist Islamic groups would meet inside mosques after the prayers were over. This gave extremists a safe haven to meet in secret without fear of consequences. However, now mosques have begun locking their doors between prayer times so as to force extremist elements out into more public places leaving them vulnerable to observation. Aside from terrorist activities Tunisia is rather safe. Al Qaeda may be present but it is no Iraq. The “Government in Tunisia has no mercy” for extremist elements (Taher).

One Tunisian-American who visits his home country periodically stated that Tunisia is blanketed in security forces making it very safe. He stated that walking down the street “every 200 meters is a [security agent] with a machine gun” (Taher). Besides the Austrian tourists being kidnapped recently only one deadly terror attack has occurred.  On April 11th 2002 “a suicide bomber detonated a truck loaded with propane gas outside a historic synagogue in Djerba, Tunisia. The 16 dead included 11 Germans, one French citizen, and three Tunisians. Twenty-six German tourists were injured. The Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Sites claimed responsibility” (Chronology). After this attack however tourism dropped for the next three years from 6 million to 1.5 million a year (Taher).

In the past year alone the terrorist threat in North Africa has “grown dramatically”. This is primarily due to the “September 2006 merger of Algeria’s GSPC with Al Qaeda” into AQIM.  The Tunisian Government is taking steps to counter this threat. In January 2007 Tunisian government forces engaged “a terrorist cell that reportedly planned to carry out terrorist acts in Tunisia”. Reportedly  members of the terror cell “had entered Tunisia from neighboring Algeria.”  In response to the growing threat the Government has allotted “significant military resources” to its land borders and coastline to “prevent this regional terrorist threat from spreading into its territory” and in response to requests by the American government “to prevent the flow of Tunisian foreign fighters to Iraq.”  The outcome of Tunisia’s efforts has produced arrests and “subsequent conviction of a number of suspected terrorists”, leaving the nation as a pillar for “stability in a region characterized by volatility and turmoil” (Plan).

There are many positive signs of success with combating terrorism in the area. The Tunisian military however, are “increasingly hampered by aging, obsolete or the total lack of equipment.” Reduced foreign aid “has resulted in significant numbers of aircraft, helicopters and vehicles that conduct border surveillance being grounded” due to maintenance and parts costs. The Tunisians have abided by requests from the United States Government to transform “their military from a conventional force into one that is dedicated to border protection and counterterrorism.” The State Department believe that it is “time for the United States to support Tunisia’s efforts and its growing needs by increasing foreign assistance” to the Tunisian Government via Foreign Military Financing and International Military Education and Training (Plan).

Apparently something is working somewhat here. Since the bombing there has been no other significant attack. The kidnapping of the Austrians occurred in the southern portion of the country which is sparse territory and under patrolled. The counterterrorism efforts are taking a multi-faceted approach in Africa and this seems to be a more successful strategy. “TSCTI, in the words of one American official addressing a regional gathering in Algiers, ‘seeks to link all of our CT [counterterrorism] efforts across the region . . . by helping to strengthen regional counterterrorism capabilities, by enhancing and institutionalizing cooperation between your security forces and ours, and . . . by promoting economic development, good governance, education, liberal institutions and democracy’" (Hemmer).

US policy towards Tunisia is often complex in nature to implement due to regional circumstances and issues of cross cultural communication. However, the United States has clearly defined goals and tactics for achieving these goals. So far progress has been the outcome of policy initiatives. “The country has enjoyed steady economic growth, has a large and literate middle class, and a climate of religious tolerance. Tunisia has laws to promote universal education and protect the rights of women, and enforces them. Tunisia is on the cusp of passage into the first world.” The most prominent obstacle is Tunisia’s political system. There needs to be more done to permit increased freedom of expression and to “encourage the development of a vibrant civil society” (Plan).

Tunisia is a unique nation that has a unique positioning in the world. History has thrown a lot of action toward the country over the last century. Most Americans dream of European vacations, which is ironic in a way as Tunisia hosts millions of tourists and expatriates a year mostly from Europe. This behavior exemplifies the wonders and gems that is Tunisia. US policy towards Tunisia has pretty much been the same concepts over the last century, merely changing enemies to be allied against. The current US administration has implemented programs such as AFRICOM, PEPFAR and the Millennium Challenge to name a few. These programs will directly take Africa from former colonial slaves to leaders of their future, players on the global stage. As 21st Century globalization continues to spread rapidly across Africa and the Middle East, it will be interesting to see how these changes affect US policy towards the small republic of Tunisia.


Works Cited
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Chronology, Significant Terrorist Incidents, 1961-2003: A Brief. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/5902.htm Accessed April 29, 2008.
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Lancaster, Pat. “The Challenge of Change”. ‘The Middle East’, June 2005, IC Publications Ltd.
Operator. Former US Intelligence. Interviewed under conditions of anonymity. Middle East, Europe & Balkans Service 2003 – 2006. April 25, 2008.
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Pham, Peter J. “Strategic Interests” “Milestone in Partnership to Counter Terrorism in the Sahel”, http://worlddefensereview.com/pham091307.shtml
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Taher. Interview with Tunisian expatriate small business owner. Washington, DC. April 29, 2008. Wikipedia 1. "1998 United States embassy bombings." Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. 24 Apr 2008. Wikimedia Foundation, Inc. 30 Apr 2008 http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=1998_United_States_embassy_bombings&oldid=207773975
Wikipedia 2. "Tunisia." Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. 26 Apr 2008. Wikimedia Foundation, Inc. 30 Apr 2008 <http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Tunisia&oldid=208280291>.