361Security
  • Intelligence
    • Blogs >
      • Paul Ashley
      • Brandon Scott >
        • Book
      • Haqmal
    • Analysis
    • Regions >
      • Global
      • Africa >
        • Kenya
        • Nigeria
        • Somalia
      • Asia >
        • Afghanistan
        • Myanmar (Burma)
        • India
        • North Korea
        • Pakistan
      • Europe >
        • Russia
      • Latin America >
        • Brazil
        • Colombia
        • El Salvador
        • Honduras
        • Mexico
        • Venezuela
      • Middle East >
        • Iran
        • Iraq
        • Jordan
        • Kuwait
        • Lebanon
        • Libya
        • Saudi Arabia
        • Syria
        • Turkey
        • Yemen
    • 'The First 300' Project
  • Services
    • US Government Services
    • Jobs Portal >
      • Leads
    • Shop
    • External Links
    • Consulting
    • Human Security
    • Development Nexus
    • Request For Information
    • Market Security
    • Key Leader Dossiers
    • Information Security
    • Literature Reviews
    • Cultural Intelligence
    • Research Resources
    • Forums (Beta)
    • Files
    • Security & Stability
    • Terrorist Profiles
  • Communications
    • About
    • Advertising
    • Public Affairs
    • Contributors >
      • Zachary Alpert
      • Paul Ashley
      • Michael Bassett
      • Ben Eden
      • Jeffrey Hawn
      • Nick Heras
      • Attila Laczko
      • Brandon Scott
      • Chris VanKirk
    • Mailing List

Natural Disasters In The North Caucasus May Lead To Greater Instability

10/1/2012

Comments

 
Executive Summary

Earlier this year, Russia’s North Caucasus experienced severe flooding. Though the affected area was one of the most stable in the region, there was a public uproar as the locals accused the government of ineffectiveness and even of deliberately causing some of the deaths. Putin’s attempts to defend himself did very little for him. The flood and its aftermath prove how volatile the North Caucasus still is, and if Russia continues to have such natural disasters, anyone with a stake in the Caucasus must prepare for the results. The U.S. can take a few simple steps now to help protect our strategic interests and our own assets: we should appeal diplomatically for an investigation and make the benefits clear to both sides, we should offer aid to Russia to help replace the most dangerous parts of its infrastructure, and we should warn our allies in the region to replace their own.

Situation

In early July this year, Russia’s Krasnodar region was struck by devastating floods. The final death toll was 172, and more than 30,000 homes were damaged, 10,000 of them beyond repair. Most of the casualties occurred in the small town of Krymsk, where emergency systems failed to notify people of a massive incoming flash flood that took less than half an hour to submerge the town in more than twenty feet of water.

            In a region already suspicious of the government, the failure of warning systems and “tsunami-like” speed of the flooding raised instant alarm bells. Theories abounded that the government had deliberately flooded Krymsk with water from a nearby dam to make sure it could not overflow into the larger city of Novorossiysk instead. Officials immediately disputed these theories, but their pre-evidentiary denials only served to fuel suspicion. The theories spread around the other regions of the North Caucasus and then to the national opposition movement.

            President Putin, already facing broader internal dissent than at any time since the earliest days of his administration, went to special effort to take care of the flooding victims. He inspected the flooded area not once but twice, promised large government payouts then demanded the sum be increased, and publicly placed all the blame on local officials, even threatening to have the governor of Krasnodar removed from office. But while he did finally provide some credible evidence that the flooding was not engineered, he inadvertently raised new problems for himself. His staff conspicuously kept him away from the flood survivors, no doubt knowing that some of them might be frustrated with him but accidentally creating an aloof, hands-off persona that only further alienated them. His efforts to blame local officials also backfired in two ways: first, one of his signature achievements is the “power vertical,” which centralizes power in his office and makes it harder to detach himself from local governance failures; second, as Krasnodar governor Aleksandr Tkachev pointed out, the problems with the original payouts were largely due to the red tape caused by Putin’s own policies.

            While the fallout from this particular flood is mostly past, it is important for the United States to anticipate other natural disasters in the North Caucasus, especially if President Putin continues to struggle with his electorate. Some experts have reported that the dam that officials supposedly opened did in fact sustain damage in the flooding, and that another large storm might cause another severe flood. The North Caucasus might also be struck with a different disaster, as evidenced by 2010’s severe wildfires. Given the level of anger at the government after the Krasnodar flood, it is not unreasonable to expect that a natural disaster in one of the more volatile parts of the Caucasus might lead to much greater anger or even a conflict.

Missing Variables

The largest hazard in deciding how to approach the North Caucasus is the lack of solid data. The government’s obstinacy toward foreign political entities and occasional habit of tilting numbers in its own favor means it is often hard to obtain reliable polling anywhere in Russia, but the North Caucasus is especially opaque. That same obstinacy combined with corruption, a rural populace, and especially repressive local governments can make it nearly impossible to find trustworthy data there. Thus, although we know from social media that there was significant anger at the government after the Krasnodar floods, it is hard to say what percentage of the public is angry, let alone which demographics and regions are most involved. This is a significant problem, because if the conspiracy theorists are only a loud minority, the policy implications are dramatically different than if they are the voice of the majority.

            Another important piece of missing information is where the local governments and their leaders stand with the Kremlin. Tkachev remains governor despite Putin’s threats, but without internal information it is hard to say whether the same would go for all the governors in the North Caucasus if faced with a similar disaster. This would be useful to know not only because it is an indicator of which regions are more volatile, but because knowing the extent to which Putin is prepared to fire people who disappoint him would speak volumes about how secure he thinks the region is overall.

            We are also missing information on the infrastructure and disaster preparedness of the rest of the North Caucasus. While Russia’s largely ex-Soviet infrastructure is showing its age, we do not have complete information on what is functional if outdated and what is genuinely dangerous. Knowing which systems are more likely to fail in a disaster and where they are concentrated would help us anticipate what crises are likely and be ready to react accordingly.

Recommendations

Though the United States might not be directly involved in a new conflict in the North Caucasus, it would pose a threat to our national interests. Not only would it endanger our relationship with Russia and thereby the security of the global political system, it could prove an immediate hazard to U.S. friends and allies like Georgia. Therefore, while the problem is only a war of words, we should do what we can to defuse the anger on both sides.

            Naturally, this means we should utilize diplomatic channels in Russia to speak to both the Kremlin and the North Caucasus. We should support an impartial investigation of the contested dam, whether by investigators from the US or elsewhere, since the Kremlin would benefit from proving that there is no conspiracy and North Caucasians would likely appreciate having the government give their concerns credence. If Putin’s administration does respond well to the investigation idea, we should also offer help with the worst of Russia’s infrastructure problems. This might not be as well received, given Russia’s consistent deep resentment of the obligations attached to foreign aid, but it could also greatly benefit all parties involved.

            Since any conflict could potentially spill over into the surrounding area, we also have limited military obligations to our allies. Security buildup is unnecessary and could make the situation dramatically worse, but it is important to give Georgia and Azerbaijan in particular fair warning to shore up their own infrastructure and to do any needed work at our nearby bases.

Julia Noecker is an Analyst at 361Security LLC
Comments
comments powered by Disqus

    Archives

    December 2024
    October 2024
    September 2024
    August 2024
    July 2024
    June 2024
    May 2024
    April 2024
    March 2024
    February 2024
    January 2024
    November 2023
    October 2023
    August 2023
    July 2023
    June 2023
    March 2023
    January 2023
    November 2022
    February 2019
    December 2018
    April 2018
    November 2017
    October 2017
    September 2017
    July 2017
    June 2017
    May 2017
    April 2017
    March 2017
    February 2017
    January 2017
    December 2016
    November 2016
    October 2016
    September 2016
    August 2016
    July 2016
    June 2016
    May 2016
    April 2016
    March 2016
    February 2016
    January 2016
    December 2015
    November 2015
    October 2015
    September 2015
    August 2015
    July 2015
    June 2015
    May 2015
    April 2015
    March 2015
    February 2015
    January 2015
    December 2014
    November 2014
    October 2014
    September 2014
    August 2014
    July 2014
    June 2014
    May 2014
    April 2014
    March 2014
    February 2014
    January 2014
    December 2013
    November 2013
    October 2013
    August 2013
    July 2013
    June 2013
    May 2013
    April 2013
    March 2013
    February 2013
    January 2013
    December 2012
    November 2012
    October 2012
    September 2012
    August 2012
    June 2012
    March 2012
    February 2012
    January 2012
    December 2011

    Categories

    All
    Afghanistan
    Africa
    Algeria
    Al Nusrah Front
    Al-Nusrah Front
    Al Qaeda
    Al Qaeda
    Al Shabaab
    Al-Shabaab
    Americas
    AMISOM
    Anarchists
    Ansar Al Sharia
    Ansar Al-Sharia
    Anti-Semitic
    AQAP
    AQIM
    Arab Spring
    Arab-spring
    Argentina
    Asia
    Asymmetrical Warfare
    Australia
    Austria
    Baghdad
    Bahrain
    Bangladesh
    Belgium
    Blackmarket
    Boko Haram
    Bomb
    Borneo
    Bosnia
    British
    Burundi
    Cairo
    Caliphate
    Cameroon
    Canada
    Car Bomb
    Cartels
    Caucasus
    Central-african-republic
    Chad
    Charity
    Chechen
    Chechnya
    Chile
    China
    Colombia
    Crime
    Crimea
    Cuba
    Czech
    Denmark
    Diaoyu
    Djibouti
    Drug Trafficking
    Dubai
    Egypt
    Elections
    Eln
    El-salvador
    Eta
    Ethiopia
    Europe
    Execution
    Explosives
    Farc
    Fatah
    Financing
    France
    Gas-attacks
    Gaza-strip
    Germany
    Global
    Golan-heights
    Great Britain
    Greece
    Guantanamo-bay
    Gulf Cooperation Council
    Hamas
    Haqqani
    Haqqani-network
    Hezballah
    Holland
    Hostage
    Human Trafficking
    Ied
    India
    Indonesia
    Inspire
    Insurgency
    Iran
    Iraq
    Ireland
    Isil
    Isis
    Islamic-revolutionary-guard
    Islamic State
    Islamist
    Israel
    Italy
    Japan
    Jeffrey Hawn
    Jerusalem
    Jihadist
    Jordan
    Kabul
    Kashmir
    Kenya
    KGB
    Kidnapped
    Kidnapping
    Kosovo
    Kurdistan
    Kuwait
    Latin America
    Latin America
    Lebanon
    Lej
    Let
    Libya
    London
    Los Zetas
    Maghreb
    Malaysia
    Mali
    Maoist
    Maritime
    Mauritania
    Mecca
    Mek
    Mend
    Mexico
    Middle East
    Milf
    Militants
    Militia
    Mogadishu
    Morocco
    Mortar-attack
    Muslim-brotherhood
    Myanmar
    Narcotics
    NATO
    Netherlands
    Niger
    Nigeria
    Northan Ireland
    North Korea
    Norway
    Nuclear
    Pakistan
    Palestine
    Peru
    Philippines
    Pij
    Pipe-bomb
    Pira
    Piracy
    Pirates
    Plf
    Plfi
    Poland
    Portugal
    Presidential-elections
    Propaganda
    Puntland
    Putin
    Qatar
    Quds-force-brigade
    Reconnaissance
    Rocket-attack
    Russia
    Sahrawi-republic
    Salafist
    Saudi Arabia
    Saudi Arabia
    Security
    Senegal
    Senkaku
    Serbia
    Shooting
    Sierra-leone
    Sinai
    Small Arms Proliferation
    Smuggling
    Somalia
    South-africa
    South-sudan
    Space
    Spain
    Spectacular
    Sri-lanka
    Strategic Defense
    Sudan
    Suicide Attack
    Switzerland
    Syria
    Tahrir
    Taliban
    Tanker
    Tanzania
    Terrorism
    Terrorists
    Terrorist Threat
    Thailand
    Threats
    Training
    Ttp
    Tuareg
    Tunisia
    Turkey
    Uae
    Uganda
    Ukraine
    UN
    United Kingdom
    United-nations
    United States
    Uvied
    Uyghur
    Vbied
    Vehicle-borne-ied
    Warfare
    Weapons
    West-bank
    Worldwide
    Yemen

    RSS Feed

© 2011 - 2024